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Abstract
Mexico, one of the world’s largest economies and an increasingly relevant actor in international
aﬀairs, is at a crucial point in defining its future policy course. Given the uncertainty surrounding the
global economy, as well as the political situation in Mexico, it is important to have a clear vision for
policy going forward. This thesis oﬀers a foundation for a national economic strategy with a long-term
vision, upon which future administrations can build as appropriate to maximize on the country’s
economic potential. The task is undertaken through a three-part approach. First, a thorough and
analytical overview of the country’s economic history provides context and lessons from which to learn.
Second, key economic issues to be addressed are identified through an evaluation of the current context
and economic outlook. Finally, an evaluation of successful policy implementation, domestically and
abroad, provides a basis that can be adapted to address the issues identified as they aﬀect Mexico. The
result is a series of six policy recommendations along two axes aimed at tackling the aforementioned
key issues. These recommendations are by no means exhaustive, nor are they meant to be. The
expectation is that they may serve to align national policy to global economic trends, underlying a
plausible strategy to realize Mexico’s productive potential.
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I. Introduction
Mexico is at a breaking point. I would use the phrase “at a crossroads” but I find it
overused and, in this particular instance, insuﬃcient in expressing the position in which the
country finds itself. Mexico is nearing the end of the third executive administration since
alternancia (political alternation) became a reality in Mexican politics and, while each
successive administration strove to align their platform to a common, national strategy two
decades in the making, the results have been less than stellar. At the same time, tensions
between every segment of society have been increasing and the sociocultural revolution is at
risk of becoming a real one.
After 12 years of control by the country’s most important opposition party in the XX
Century, the country returned to its roots and, in 2012, elected Enrique Peña Nieto, the
dashing, young darling of the PRI, to the federal Executive. His promise? To lead a coalition
government that promised to deliver on the Mexico’s untapped economic potential.
At the time, political leaders in the country insisted that Mexico was “going through
an historic moment,” and the Pact for Mexico was signed to the cheering of the country’s three
largest political parties—PRI, PAN, and PRD. The business community found itself equally
as ecstatic. Six months into the Peña Nieto administration, Fitch upgraded Mexico’s domestic
credit rating to an A- (up from a BBB+) and, immediately following the passage of the financial
reform in 2014, BBVA announced it would pour USD 3.5 billion worth of investment into
Mexico over the course of the following four years.
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Four years later and Mexico’s growth has stunted. Since 2014, annual growth has
barely reached passed the 2 percent mark, a number more appropriate for a developed
economy, and real wages have actually seen a decrease since 2006—a Mexican worker today
has roughly the same purchasing power as she would have had 20 years ago. Violence, on the
downtrend in 2013, has peaked, reaching its highest level since the country began collecting
data on violent death rates—25,339 homicides were recorded in 2017, up 23 percent from a
year prior!1 And President Peña Nieto’s approval rating sits at a dismal 21 percent, whereas 69
percent of Mexicans disapprove of him.2 As a result, the polls for the general election of 2018—
the largest in Mexican history, with 3,226 elected positions up for grabs—point to a
cataclysmic shift to the far left, the abandoning of a neoliberal national strategy, and
potentially, the collapse of the Mexican democratic experiment.3 So, Mexico is at a breaking
point.
I do not pretend to single-handedly undertake the gargantuan task that is defining
policy for the world’s eleventh largest economy. And claiming to do so would set me up for
failure. Rather, the impetus behind the research and ideas here presented come from the belief
that crafting a new strategy to solidify Mexico’s growth and take advantage of the country’s
potential is a crucial task to stay the course of economic and democratic consolidation which
have characterized the country’s recent history.
As stated by former Secretary of Finance—and a distant third in this year’s presidential
election polling—José Antonio Meade Kuribreña, a key policy goal of future administrations

1

Patrick Gillespie, “Mexico reports highest murder rate on record,” CNN (22 January 2018).
Rolando Ramos, “Aprobación de Enrique Peña Nieto,” El Economista (1 March 2018).
3
Enrique Krauze, “¿López Obrador, liberal?” El País (17 February 2018).
2
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will be to position Mexico as a recognized and influential power in the global arena. The
current Secretary of Foreign Aﬀairs, Luis Videgaray Caso, has already made inroads on the
regional stage: Mexico largely led the Latin American response to the crisis in Venezuela in
2017. And in the recent discussions regarding NAFTA, faced with two challenging negotiating
parties with clear goals in mind, the Mexican delegation has been steadfast in its commitment
to free trade and defending Mexico’s interests, to the surprise of many in Washington and
Ottawa.4
However, in order to continue along that path, lawmakers in the near future should
strive to achieve two things. On the one hand, future economic policy should be developed
taking into account the considerations of the Washington Consensus while keeping in mind
the particular strengths and weaknesses of the Mexican economic context. On the other hand,
in implementing these policies, the government should pay special attention to the broader
impact of the policies. In other words, policies should be designed to target economic growth
while addressing social issues concurrently. The greatest criticisms of the Consensus have
always been the lack of distributive growth and the exacerbation of economic and social
inequalities that often arises as a result of neoliberal policies. To continue on a path of
sustainable liberalism, the next administration will have to take into account this reality, lest
the democratic progress Mexico has achieved be reversed.
The goal of this thesis is to develop a series of policy recommendations to serve as the
foundation of a cohesive, inclusive, and growth-oriented strategy for Mexico’s short- to

4

Patrick J. McDonnell, “Mexico signals tougher stance on NAFTA, may pull out of talks if Trump moves to
scrap deal,” Los Angeles Times (31 August 2017); Franklin Foer, “Mexico’s Revenge,” The Atlantic (May 2017).
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medium-term economic policy. These foundations will rest on an in-depth overview of the
country’s recent economic history, an assessment of the most pressing risks facing the Mexican
economy today, and the diﬀusion of eﬀective policymaking elsewhere adjusted for Mexico’s
unique context. My hope is that the incoming administration will take into consideration the
policy tools prescribed in this composition and take advantage of the opportunities they oﬀer
in the definition of the country’s new economic strategy. The direction the government takes
from this administration forward, after all, will be key in determining Mexico’s capacity to
realize its potential in the long run.

6

II. Review of relevant literature
Theories of economic development
The Neoclassical Theory and the International Dependence Theory, the latest and yet
outdated theories of economic development, continue to have an outsized influence on
policymaking in the developing world. Both theories place a special emphasis in the role of
global trade as a tool for development. In this respect, Mexico is not the exception. In Latin
America specifically, the impetus for the implementation of policies akin to the two theories
mentioned has been the now infamous Washington Consensus. As outlined by John
Williamson in 1990, the Consensus outlines specific policy areas which Washington sought
Latin American governments reform prior to receiving further assistance from the Washington
Institutions—the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the US Treasury—in
solving the debt crises of the late 1980s in the region.5 The “ten commandments,”6 as described
by Williamson, are:
1. Fiscal discipline,
2. Reëvaluation of public expenditure priorities,
3. Tax Reform,
4. Liberalization of positive interest rates,
5. Achievement of a competitive exchange rate,

5

John Williamson, ed., and Institute for International Economics (U.S.), Latin American Adjustment: How
Much Has Happened? (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990), Ch. 2.
6
Philip Arestis, “Washington Consensus and Financial Liberalization,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 27,
no. 2 (2004): 252.
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6. Trade liberalization,
7. Removal of limits on foreign direct investment inflows,
8. Privatization,
9. Deregulation, and
10. Protections for property rights.
Over the course of the last thirty years, five presidents and their respective governments
have overseen the ongoing transition of Mexico’s economy. Generally, policies enacted by each
successive administration—all of which have been categorically center-right to right on
economic matters—have tended to follow the recommendations set forth by the Consensus.
The initial steps in the transition towards economic liberalism were undertaken by President
Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982-1988), which included reforms to trade that opened the
Mexican market to foreign competition—notably, signing into law the country’s accession to
the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade—and the lifting of strict controls on capital flows
implemented by the prior administration. Immediately after taking oﬃce in 1988, Carlos
Salinas de Gortari undertook privatization of virtually all sectors of the economy (with the
notable exception of the energy sector) with the explicit goal of shifting the country’s model
of production to export-oriented industrialization. On 17 December 1992, Salinas and his
norther counterparts signed the North American Free Trade Agreement. The treaty oﬃcially
entered into eﬀect on 1 January 1994 and, in May of the same year, Mexico became the first
developing country to join the OECD. The former remains, to this day, the administration’s
most lauded achievement and one of the highest impact policies on Mexico’s long-term
economic development.

8

Following the Mexican peso crisis of 1994, the administration of Ernesto Zedillo
Ponce de León was the first to actively pursue a floating exchange rate. Since the beginning of
his administration—which ended on 30 November 2000—the Bank of Mexico (Banxico) has
exercised limited monetary intervention, allowing free-market forces to determine the value of
the peso with relation to the U.S. dollar. When Banxico does intervene, the purpose is not to
defend a rate of exchange but rather to target inflation and stabilize expectations. Such policies
have served the economy well: since then, the managed floating exchange rate, paired with 20
years of responsible public finances, has improved credibility and served as a buﬀer for the
Mexican economy against exogenous shocks that would otherwise destabilize the country.
Recently, the most decisive change in the government’s general policy orientation has
been the signing of the Pacto por México (Pact for Mexico). Notably, the pact delivers the final
blow to Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) and the Comisión Federal de Electricidad: the passing
of the Energy Reform of 2013. Among other things, the Energy Reform has been the most
decisive policy enacted aimed at breaking the cumbersome, legal monopolies that the two
aforementioned companies operate in the country’s petroleum and electricity industries
respectively. The reform works in synchrony with twelve additional reforms in other sectors,
ranging from public finance, penal procedures, and the electoral system to banking,
telecommunications, and economic competitiveness. The goal of the reform package is to
address the underlying obstacles to growth as defined by the current administration: market
distortions, low productivity, and corruption.7

7

, Richard H.K. Vietor and Haviland Sheldahl-Thomason, "Mexico's Energy Reform," (Case study, Harvard
Business School, January 2017; Revised August 2017), Case: 717-027: 4.

9

If the idea of a rigid and punishing implementation of the Washington Consensus has
repeatedly been rebuked, not only by economists following opposing theories of development,
but by the author of the original consensus himself8, the recommendations are not necessarily
ill-formulated. Indeed, it is imperative to consider the individual country’s specific
circumstances—especially factors which may impact the eﬀectiveness of changes in economic
policy such as the composition of trade, geographical limitations, and socialized
understandings of economics at odds with the long-standing Western paradigms. Even so, the
general principles on which the recommendations rest have been proved to be solid and
applicable to Mexico, subject to adjustments specific to the country’s reality.
In order to adequately assess the impact of each of the aforementioned policies, as well
as their eﬀectiveness in the larger push for economic development, it is necessary to assess the
origin of each policy, considering the national context at the time of their inception and
passing. The earliest concrete example was Mexico’s signature and later ratification of the
North American Free Trade Agreement. Which begs the question: why was NAFTA sought?

Perspectives on liberalism
As of today, the literature available on the topic of trade liberalization, economic
reform and the changing in government policies to that eﬀect are varied. The general agreement

8

John Williamson, “The Washington Consensus and Beyond,” Economic and Political Weekly 38, no. 15
(2003): 1476. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4413431.
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is that low productivity is to blame for the lack of growth in the Mexican economy on an
individual level and the gross wealth disparities.9
Many argue that the concept of trade liberalization itself—and in eﬀect, the
domination of the economy and policies surrounding it by free-market forces—is a fallacy.
The argument suggests that neoliberal reforms are a means to a simple reorganization of the
institutions which regulate commerce.10 To this eﬀect, orthodox economic analysis on the
country’s present situation argues that the reason for Mexico’s lack of growth—and the
solution to it—are not related to a lack of openness to global markets. It criticizes high labor
informality, social safety nets that incentivize informal labor, procyclical monetary and fiscal
policy, institutionalized market rigidities owing from the existence of private oligopolies and
monopolies, and weak oversight of the state over private enterprise and labor unions, for the
lack of dynamism in productivity.11 Most orthodox analysts argue that for the country to
progress at every economic level and reduce inequalities, the rule of law has to establish its
sovereignty in politics and over the market forces in a way which allows the free market forces
to operate without permitting rampant wealth concentration at the top.
However, there are those who oppose this traditional understanding. According to
Cárdenas, the period between the beginning of the Mexican Revolution (1910) and the start
of World War II, often dismissed as a period primarily concerned with the shifting of power

9

BID (Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo), 2013; World Bank, 2014; Banco de México, 2013; International
Monetary Fund, 2014.
10
Richard Snyder, Politics after Neoliberalism: Reregulation in Mexico, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press (2001): 195.
11
Blanca L. Avendaño Vargas and Ignacio Perrotini Hernández, “Insuficiencia Dinámica, Crecimiento Y
Desempleo En México, 1974-2012,” Investigación Económica 74, No. 293, Facultad de Economía, Universidad
Nacional Autónoma de México, (2015): 100.
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between insurgents, was the most important period in setting the economic ideology that
would allow modern Mexico to develop.12 Moreover, it was precisely Mexico’s openness to the
global markets at the time and its large-scale dependence on import goods which allowed for
import substitution to result when flexible national monetary policy devalued the peso,
decreasing the price of domestic goods relative to their imported counterparts. Cárdenas makes
the case that the “Mexican Miracle” was not so much a miracle as it was the natural
consequence of countercyclical policy decisions taken in the country to mitigate the domestic
eﬀects of the Great Depression, decisions which, if unintentionally, spurred domestic industry
and accelerated domestic growth in a period of global economic contraction. This position,
therefore, diﬀers from that of the traditional body of academics, in arguing that intelligent
domestic policy, coupled with government restraint and a focus on “capital-intensive”
economic growth, will allow the country to sail with the global economic currents—otherwise
known as “free-market pressures.”13

Liberalism, bedrock of democracy
Irrespective of the ideological current to which academics ascribe, few challenge the
positive impact that liberalization, integration into global markets, and the expansion of the
private sector had on Mexico’s long democratic transition.

12

Enrique Cárdenas, “Mexico's Industrialization During the Great Depression: Public Policy and Private
Response”, The Journal of Economic History 44 (2), (Cambridge University Press, 1984): 603.
13
Ibid: 605.
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The clearest example of this was the PRI’s progressive loss of control over local and
state governments in the aftermath of the crisis produced by López Portillo’s actions in the
1980s. Kelsner describes the unusual arrangements the governing party made with the main
opposition party, PAN, to provide congressional support for liberalizing economic reforms, as
liberalism was unpopular among political circles for the better part of the century. In exchange,
the PRI allowed electoral reforms that took a toll on the party’s hold over congress—three
years later, the party would lose control of Congress for the first time since the Revolution of
1910.14 These kinds of developments are at the foundation of the theory of democratization
through economic development.
A more nuanced assessment of this impact is presented by Russell Crandall’s. Mexico’s
macroeconomic stabilization achievements represent a momentous shift towards “the end of
history,” as Francis Fukuyama would describe the culmination of the country’s economic and
democratic consolidation. However, that end is still distant, and the achievement of broad
strategic objectives obligates the shift towards addressing narrower issues across the board,
including stable employment, a balanced income distribution, fiscal reorganization to rely on
tax revenues, investments in education and other sorts of human capital, and the consolidation
of the country’s justice system.15 In essence, it was the centrally-planned, developmentoriented strategies implemented during the final years of the PRI’s hold on power that paved

14

Joseph L. Kelsner, “An Electoral Route to Democracy? Mexico's Transition in Comparative
Perspective,” Comparative Politics 30, No. 4 (1998): 482.
15
Russell Crandall, “Introduction: The Challenges of Democratic Change in Mexico,” in R. Crandall,
Guadalupe Paz, and Riordan Roett, eds., Mexico’s Democracy at Work: Political and Economic Dynamics,
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers; 2005): 1-3.
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the way for underlying issues to take a front seat in a participatory democracy. This, however,
brings on an additional set of challenges.
A counterargument of Mexico’s democratic transition, however, highlights the unique
nature of the process in the country when compared to its regional neighbors. Unlike
Argentina or Chile, democracy did not develop in Mexico as a result of a cathartic uprising
against an oppressive military dictatorship. Rather, Andreas Schedler’s theory of
“democratization by elections” is of particular interest in an eﬀort to understand how the
country’s political transition came about. Schedler suggests that the gradual development of a
democratic political environment in the country meant that political institutions would be
ineﬀective in addressing the increasingly complex issues associated with an open market, a
liberal economy, and a participatory democracy. 16 The Mexican case, to a degree, supports this
perception.
However, taking into account the former conceptualization of democratization, the
inadequacy described by Schedler may be adaptive in nature. As Mexico continues to develop
toward a complex and advanced market economy, one where private actors take responsibility
in addressing macroeconomic issues, further ground may be opened in the public arena to
delve into the complexities of a participatory democracy.
Moreno-Brid and Ros present evidence of this in a historical analysis of the relationship
between the state and the economy. Of particular note is the diﬃculty that the administration
of President Luis Echeverría in balancing stabilizing growth with curbing the country’s

16

Andreas Schedler, “The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections,” International Political Science Review
/ Revue Internationale De Science Politique 23, No. 1 (2002).
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growing inequality. Under near-complete state management, the administration’s technical
expertise and resources were unable to address both fronts at the same time. The policies
implemented for redistributive growth proved eﬀective in reducing income disparities but
threw the country’s macroeconomic fundamentals into disarray.
Although a balance of priorities is described as untenable, the authors’ assessment takes
a turn, to argue that the state’s detachment from market intervention has not been translated
into increased eﬃciency in addressing social concerns.17 However, the article was written in
2004, and since then, the last two administrations have taken more decisive action to address
many of these social iniquities. Whether they have positive results is to be seen—as with all
change, results can be impacted by external factors, and the current economic environment
may play a large role in that.

The importance of free trade
Without a doubt, the most important policy decision in Mexico’s modern history has
been the ratification and implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). The agreement is, in its present form, a multilateral free-trade area that encompasses
Canada, Mexico, and the United States. However, unlike more integrated trade blocs such as
the European Union, Mercosur, or the ASEAN Economic Community, integration within
NAFTA is limited to the elimination of barriers to trade—both tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ—without
provisions to bring the member states into a common market or an economic union. That

17

Juan Carlos Moreno Brid and Jaime Ros, “Instituciones y Desarrollo Económico: La Relación EstadoMercado en México Desde una Perspectiva Histórica,” Revista Mexicana de Sociología 66 (2004): 164-74.
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being said, the economic consensus suggests the agreement’s implementation has been behind
Mexico’s economic leaps in the past two and a half decades and has pushed the trade bloc to
be the world’s largest and most dynamic economic region.
The rhetoric of the 2016 U.S. election cycle notwithstanding, NAFTA’s economic
benefits are by no means questionable. In numerical terms, the impact is clear: Mexico’s
exports totaled USD 70.3 billion in 1994, which represented 13.3 percent of the country’s
gross domestic product; at the end of 2016, the figure stood at USD 399.1 billion, or 38.2
percent of GDP.18 And these figures do not represent an overall increase in the country’s
exports globally. According to the Atlas of Economic Complexity, published by Harvard
University using data from the United Nations database of international trade statistics,
COMTRADE, a full 80.3 percent of those exports—totaling USD 320.5 billion—go to its
NAFTA partners.19 Along similar lines, Mexico’s purchasing power has skyrocketed—over the
same period of time, imports have grown by USD 334.1 billion; and yet again, the country’s
participation in NAFTA means that, as of 2016, USD 269.5 billion or 64.44 percent of
imports originate in either the United States or Canada. More importantly, as a share of the
American oﬀer, the elevated purchasing power has allowed Mexico to become the United
States’ second largest consumer, capturing just under a sixth of U.S. exports.
Beyond the raw data, the implementation of the agreement has had positive eﬀects on
Mexican society at large. Mexico’s HDI, a measure of standard of living that takes into account
life expectancy, literacy, per capita income, access to services, and degree of marginalization,

18
19

World Bank, 2017.
Atlas of Economic Complexity, Harvard University, 2016.
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among other things, has sustained constant, well-paced growth, indicating a general rise in the
wellbeing of the average Mexican. Before continuing to analyze the impact scale of NAFTA’s
implementation in Mexico, however, consider the factors that influenced Mexico’s
determination to enter into such an asymmetrical free trade agreement.
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III. Economic history and policy antecedents
The run-up to a North American trade bloc
To understand the country that Salinas led into the most avant-garde trade bloc of the
era—bar the common market that Europe had been developing since the 1950s—it is
important to consider Mexico’s vulnerable position through the better part of the 1980s.

Bank nationalization and the Lost Decade
Through the 1970s, administrations shifted decisively towards economic structuralism,
with heavy reliance on public expenditure for infrastructure projects, which were in turn
financed through foreign borrowing and the inflows from petroleum exports. However,
pressure from the private sector, foreign corporations, and neoliberal economists hindered the
implementation of President Luis Echeverría’s plans for a continuation of the country’s growth
based on a state-directed economic platform. This “dispute” for control of the nation’s
economic future would continue into the following decade—in 1982, the outgoing
administration was left to choose between the two and ultimately chose to follow tradition.
During the 1970s, Mexican banks were encouraged to expand operations overseas and
participate in international financial markets as a tool to strengthen the domestic financial
sector. As would later be condemned by President José López Portillo (1976-1982), Mexican
banks became powerful enough to undermine the policy goals of the administration: while
Banxico fought for prudence to maintain economic stability, the finance ministry (Secretaría

18

de Hacienda y Crédito Público; SHCP) and the presidency were torn internally between factions
looking for sustained industrialization at the expense of the country’s economic reality and
those who sought to stabilize the national economy by reining in the financial sector.20
According to prominent presidential adviser Carlos Tello, the sheer size of the finance industry
achieved through internationalization was a threat to the government’s ability to guide national
economic policy and remain in control of the country.21
With respect to the federal budget, upon taking oﬃce in 1976, and with the support
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) among others, López Portillo embarked on
financial adjustment plans based on public austerity and curtailing government expenditures.
The discovery of vast petroleum reserves in 1978, however, led to a sharp tack: the
administration began spending inordinate amounts of money, fueled by the assumption that
oil prices would remain steady. Halfway through 1981, oil prices took a serious downturn,
and crashed the following year. López Portillo refused to act, and instead continued borrowing
from private lenders abroad at exponential rates, propping up domestic job creation and
absorbing insolvent businesses as necessary.22 In August of 1982, four months away from
leaving oﬃce, López Portillo finally gathered a team of advisers to suggest containment
strategies in 1982. An oﬃcial in the López Portillo administration would later acknowledge
that the president was wary of rocking the boat in the year prior to election.

20

Sylva Maxfield, “The International Political Economy of Bank Nationalization: Mexico in Comparative
Perspective,” Latin American Research Review 27, no. 1 (1992): 78-80.
21
Carlos Tello, La nacionalización de la banca, Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1984.
22
Viviana Elizabeth Zárate Mirón, “Capítulo 1. Marco de referencia,” in Convergencia en el crecimiento de los
estados de México a partir del Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN) (Professional thesis,
Universidad de las Américas Puebla, 2009), 3.
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As described by Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, a former adviser to Echeverría, and eventual
National Security Advisor to the Fox administration (2000-2006), during the PRI’s years in
power, and especially as the democratic transition of the early nineties neared, rifts within the
party were most present at the end of a sexenio, when diﬀerent factions vied for a nomination
that would advance their interests. This means the party’s hold on power—and by
consequence, political stability—were in greatest danger during transition of power.23
Understanding this dynamic meant that López Portillo knew that he had to maintain trust in
the party as the 1982 election cycle neared. The fall in oil prices resulted in reduced revenue
from petroleum exports and an overvaluation of the peso—which at the time was still subject
to consistent intervention from Banxico to maintain a stable and favorable exchange rate visà-vis the dollar. Neoliberal economic policy, aimed at mitigating the eﬀects of external shocks,
prescribes that the fall should have been answered immediately by allowing the currency to
lose value against the dollar and tightening the federal budget to limit borrowing, as debt
repayment should be prioritized under a depreciated peso. The alternative, is a long and painful
correction of the overvaluation paired with government insolvency.24 But this amounted to
political suicide, and López Portillo was looking to prop up the party’s image.
To this end he requested the advice Tello—who by then no longer figured in the
president’s oﬃcial counsel—and José Andrés de Oteyza, then Minister of Natural Resources
and Industrial Development, among others. Tello and Oteyza were both structuralists,
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educated at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) under Horacio Flores
de la Peña, an avowed socialist wary of neoliberalism and the private sector.
With the election of François Mitterrand to the French presidency in 1981, the French
Parti socialiste undertook deep eﬀorts towards nationalization of several sectors of the French
economy, notably, key productive industries and finance. It is also no coincidence that, in
1982, Mexico’s Ambassador to France was the very same Flores de la Peña. When Tello and
Oteyza began formulating proposals to bring a plausible, politically popular solution to
President López Portillo, Flores de la Peña suggested evaluating the possibility of nationalizing
Mexico’s financial sector, as France had done a year prior. The president, looking for a
politically viable solution, and enraged by the financial crisis facing Mexico, was easily
convinced that the proposition would be the most eﬀective way to combat massive capital
flight, which drained as much as USD 5 billion in a matter of weeks through Mexico’s largest
commercial bank, Bancomer.25
Between August and the time Miguel de la Madrid took oﬃce in December of 1982,
the Mexican economy had already contracted by 0.52 percent. By the end of 1983, GDP had
contracted by over USD 100 billion, and the peso had lost 500 percent of its value. Adding to
the crisis left behind by López Portillo, the 1985 Mexico City earthquake left behind over
USD 5 billion in damages26, and by 1987, inflation in Mexico soared just shy of 160 percent.27
The tragic outcomes in Mexico sent reverberations across the region. While some countries
were able to avoid the brunt of the economic collapse through fixed exchange rates which
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curbed inflationary upturns, poverty rates, unemployment—and especially relevant in today’s
context, employment informalization—and income inequality shot up. Over the course of the
decade, Latin America as a whole actually saw a decrease in real per capita GDP. This would
be known as the Lost Decade.28

Mexico’s economic aperture: De la Madrid and neoliberalism
As a response to the mess left by his predecessor, President De la Madrid took a drastic
turn in Mexican commercial and domestic economic policies. His administration marked the
beginning of neoliberalism in Mexico. His primary goal was overseeing the transition of
Mexico’s economic model, starting in 1985, from its traditional import-substitution
industrialization regime for domestic growth to an export-oriented model. 29 In addition to
that, he departed from party tradition in a groundbreaking way for a developing economy: he
was the first president since the PRI took control of the country in 1929 to convincingly
commit his administration to public austerity measures. As explained before, up until his
election, the presidency and legitimacy thereof were inextricable from its obligation to bring
economic growth through policy decision. However, because of decisions made during the
two administrations prior to his, further government overreach would yield no results in terms
of growth.30 Instead, De la Madrid focused his eﬀorts on attracting foreign investment to
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supply the country with a desperately-needed flow of cash untied to the federal government.
Furthermore, he worked to reintegrate the Mexican economy into global financial systems.
The De la Madrid administration’s most notable policy feat was the signing and
ratification of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade in August of 1986. The importance
of this cannot be overstated. At face value, it signaled a commitment to global liberalist
tendencies which inevitably drew power from the PRI party establishment. More importantly,
however, it tied Mexican industry to global markets. Furthermore, he initiated a large-scale
privatization of a number of state businesses, reducing the total number by around twothirds.31 Through these actions, De la Madrid laid the groundwork for Mexico’s democratic
transition—given the precarious situation of the party and global tendencies, any future leaders
would find it untenable to continue with a domestic political regime that ran in complete
opposition to the economic principles it was embracing.

Crafting NAFTA
The idea of a free trade bloc encompassing Canada, Mexico, and the United States had
been around for over a decade before Salinas, former U.S. President George H.W. Bush (19891993), and former Prime Minister of Canada Brian Mulroney (1984-1993) signed the
finalized agreement in 1992. In 1986, the U.S. administration under President Ronald
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Reagan, one of the staunchest supporters of global free trade32, made calls for the negotiation
of a free trade agreement between the U.S. and Mexico as the only viable solution to Mexico’s
recurring sovereign debt troubles, which by then had reached USD 98 billion.33
Perhaps considered overly optimistic, the transition in Mexico’s economy from 1986
to 1993 was drastic. As discussed earlier, the De la Madrid and Salinas administrations
undertook economic reforms of a neoliberal current with a speed that surprised even the most
optimistic of policymakers and analysts. Beyond the gradual removal of non-tariﬀ barriers to
trade, including quotas and license requirements for imports, tariﬀs were slashed from 100 to
50 percent under GATT rules, and then unilaterally reduced further to a maximum of 20
percent. By the early nineties, controls on foreign investment for a majority of industries had
nearly disappeared.34 This meant that when Salinas oﬃcially requested a start of negotiations
to establish a free trade agreement with the United States, the corresponding Bush
administration, very much ideologically aligned with the previous president’s views on
liberalization, was only too keen to begin negotiations as soon as possible to reduce all barriers
to trade with its southern neighbor.35
The main changes to Mexico’s trade policy as a result of NAFTA were as follows:
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1. A gradual removal of all barriers to trade, tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ, to the two-way
flow of products.
Prior to the implementation of NAFTA, U.S. products in Mexico faced, on average, a
10 percent tariﬀ, compared to the average 2.07 percent tariﬀs for products travelling in the
opposite direction. Two years into the progression of tariﬀ elimination, the means had fallen
to roughly 3 percent and under 1 percent respectively.36 These were of special note for the
textile, auto, and agricultural industries, where tariﬀs placed on U.S. imports into Mexico were
as high as 20 percent in the automotive industry.37
2. Liberalization and standardization of trade in services.
Through the agreements on the topic of service trade, a common framework was laid
out for issues such as investment, transnational sales, and nondiscrimination of products.
Notably, the framework of NAFTA allowed Mexico an exception to the aforementioned rules
in petroleum exploration and extraction, allowing Mexico to keep its moneymaker, Pemex,
away from its momentum towards complete market liberalization indefinitely.38 Instead,
Salinas focused on a “modernization” of the entity and its operations, 39 a move which was
little more than internal restructuring which prevented the industry from expanding in
productivity through the advantages of liberalization.40
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3. Provisions protecting IP rights, promoting foreign investment, and establishing
arbitration systems for trade-related disputes.
Given that many of these issues were innovative—TRIPS would only be cemented
into international trade framework two years later with the ratification and entry into force of
the WTO—NAFTA essentially provided a framework for the new trade that would take place
among the three countries to be tightly regulated and promote inclusive development across
the three-member states.
Immediately after the treaty’s entry into force, however, economic discipline troubles
put Mexico into a tough situation which would prevent the treaty from seeing results for
another 5 years.

The Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994
One of the most prolific crises in recent history, and one with global repercussions,
aﬀecting both the developing and the developed world, was the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994.
Arguably, the cause of the crisis itself stemmed from a single policy decision. Commonly
known as el error de diciembre, its results were dictated primarily by its timing and the
immediate response by the government and market actors. The decision to allow the controlled
devaluation of the peso, however, was not without its merits. Monetary and fiscal policy
leading up to December 1994 necessitated the very decision which academics, and even the
outgoing president, condemned as the genesis of the crisis. At the time, however, experts who
defended the policy decision argued that the Mexican economy would recover after a mild
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recession caused by the devaluation. The question this work aims to answer is how political
factors in the run-up to the 1994 presidential election deepened the eﬀects of the devaluation,
causing a full-fledged crisis requiring a bailout to the tune of USD 52 billion and with
repercussions felt in the developing world for nearly a decade after.
Salinas assumed the presidency after a highly fraught election in 1988. In an eﬀort to
repair his reputation following the debacle of the election, his administration embarked on a
series of ambitious neoliberal reforms which aimed to achieve three goals. First, the opening
of the Mexican market to international competition and a shift to export-oriented
industrialization; second, the privatization of virtually all sectors of the economy—with the
notable exception of the energy sector—and; third, macroeconomic stability through restraint
in monetary and fiscal policy. To the surprise of many, and the pleasure of Wall Street, his
administration successfully reined in inflation, spurred economic growth, and stabilized the
Mexican economy with such swiftness that experts and academics revived the term “the
Mexican miracle”, reflecting the optimism of foreign actors, private and public, with regards
to Mexico’s path to development. Inflation fell precipitously, from the record highs of the late
1980s, to under 8 percent in 1993; in two years, foreign reserves, a key sign of economic
stability, grew from virtually zero to USD 6.3 billion in 1989, and had reached just under
USD 30 billion by January 1994.41 Confidence in the Mexican economy was so strong that,
between 1990 and 1993, Mexico captured fully one fifth of net capital flows to developing
countries—no less than USD 104 billion over the course of four years. The signing of NAFTA
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in January 1994 and the country’s admission into the OECD in May of the same year
cemented the belief that Mexico was poised to become a developed economy by the turn of
the millennium, and not without reason.42
In spite of aggressive investor presence, by early 1993 there were serious signs that
the macroeconomic policy decisions, fiscal and monetary, which had resulted in rapid growth,
were unsustainable. Inflation, while drastically lower than it had been six years prior, was still
above target. This posed a problem for the fixed-nominal rate-based stabilization, which led to
a real appreciation of the peso because it did not account for a higher domestic rate of inflation.
The sheer size of capital inflows was another problem—large foreign demand for Mexican
securities placed heavy upward pressure on the value of the peso43. Economists had suggested
that a nominal devaluation of the peso, which had moved from a fixed peg, to a crawling peg,
to an adjustable band, was a necessary step to correct this overvaluation.44 If left to be corrected
naturally, the process would be long and painful, with years of low growth and high
unemployment eventually depreciating the real currency to match the nominal exchange rate.45
The overvaluation of the currency played an important role in the widening of the
country’s current account deficit, which is the first of the reasons why the impact of the crisis
was so deep.46 Mexico’s economic history since the Revolution of 1910 largely consisted of a
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closed economy, a development strategy based on import-substitution industrialization, and
growth primarily driven by government spending. The liberalization reforms taken on the by
the Salinas administration were seen as a move in the right direction, and heavily praised by
Bill Clinton at the signing of NAFTA. The domestic public’s perception to them, however,
was much less enthusiastic. Mexicans believed the country’s trade liberalization regime to be a
temporary opening with the aim of accessing foreign capital to spur growth and were not
confident in the regime’s permanence. This belief encouraged people to import “while they
could”. Because capital flows kept pouring into the country, Mexico could maintain this
current account deficit for a while, accumulating foreign reserves, but deepening the deficit as
they went.47 Due to a prolonged, low level of domestic savings, any shocks to the flow of capital
would cause an imbalance in consumption, which proved to be accurate after the crisis.
Between 1994 and 1996, real income fell by 23 percentage points which then led to a 19
percentage-point reduction in consumption.48
An additional cause for concern was the proportion of capital flows to Mexico
which came in the form of portfolio investment. As mentioned before, Mexico captured over
USD 100 billion in net capital flow between 1990 and 1993. However, USD 61 billion of
that total was in the form of portfolio investment; less than USD 17 billion came in the form
of FDI.49 The problem with stock market investments is that they are highly liquid, and as
easily as they move into a country during periods of investor optimism—as they did during
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the last three years of the Salinas administration—they move out of a country at the slightest
sign of a panic. This distinction is one of the crucial points in formulating sound economic
policy, especially as it relates to capital attraction. For increased productivity, an industry must
be able to take advantage of positive cash flows and inject them into the economy in the form
of real wage growth or added value.50 In the aftermath of the December devaluation, the
Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV) took a nosedive, depleting the country of the necessary flow
of dollars, and forcing the Mexican government to act.51
Upon arrival in Los Pinos, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León removed Pedro Aspe
from the helm of the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP). He replaced the former
leadership of the country’s financial institutions with his own team of economists, led by Jaime
Serra Puche, to deal with the mounting balance of payments problem and the overvalued peso,
both of which were brought on by his predecessor’s policies. On December 20, 1994, less than
a month after his inauguration, the Zedillo administration announced the widening of the
exchange rate band to correct the latter of the two issues, moving the upper limit from MXN
3.47 to MXN 4.00 to the U.S. dollar.52 Zedillo, a career economist with experience in
exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in Banxico, had recommended the devaluation while working
as an adviser to the Salinas administration. Under normal circumstances, the relatively modest
increase (15.3 percentage points) to the upper limit of the exchange rate band would have been
inconsequential, incurring a mild recession and a speedy recovery, driven by renewed export
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growth and domestic production. However, 1994 was marred by a series of scandals and news
of national importance that put a strain on the government’s ability to weather the slow in
capital flows. 53 While delaying the devaluation of the peso an entire year, Salinas burned
through over USD 20 billion in foreign reserves in an eﬀort to maintain the value of the peso
artificially high to sustain the country’s current account deficit.54 In doing so, he eﬀectively
spoiled the potential for the work of his sexenio to bear fruit.

Economic stabilization and growth
As a result of the Mexican Peso crisis, profound changes to policy were implemented
to reduce the risk associated with investment in Mexico during the Salinas period. Prior to
1994, poor fiscal management led to an overdependence on unfulfillable guarantees to attract
foreign capital. Moreover, industry was under regulated, crony capitalism dominated the
relatively young private sector, and the country’s monetary policy was largely aimed at keeping
the peso attractive for foreign investors, whatever the cost.

Tequila on an empty stomach
Prior to 1994, Mexico’s banking sector which had only been privatized in the three
years leading up to the crisis, was ill-regulated and excessively exposed to risky investments.
The National Banking Commission (CNB) was understaﬀed, lacked the information
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technology necessary to adequately gather data on the banks, and did not have the legal
authority for eﬀective oversight of the banking industry.55 As a result, a considerable share of
loans outstanding issued by the newly-privatized institutions were non-performing.56 Salinas’
administration knew this: the privatization of banks had been speedy with loose guidelines for
the payment of the winning bids, meaning some payments were made by borrowing from the
same institutions they were purchasing. In spite of this, Banxico established a contingency
fund known as Fobaproa (Banking Fund for the Protection of Savings) through which it
committed itself to guaranteeing all bank liabilities excluding subordinate debt.57 The
administration knew this was the country’s economic Achilles’ heel— given the scale of
deposits in private banks, Banxico would be unable to maintain the system afloat if the sector
collapsed.
On the topic of the peso’s value, the government’s general economic strategy was to
treat any adverse shocks to the economy as a temporary obstacle to be “sterilized” through
government borrowing.58 In part, this meant maintaining the value of the peso stable vis-à-vis
the dollar and keep interest rates from climbing.59 Towards 1994, this stability in the peso’s
nominal exchange rate was a source of confidence in the market’s stability. Because of the scale
of capital inflows, the peso quickly appreciated. In spite of this, exports continued to grow, an
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indicator used as evidence that the peso was not overvalued. Economists however, argued the
contrary, and deemed the imbalance a threat to the country’s growth. Notably, Rudiger
Dornbusch and Alejandro Werner wrote and spoke extensively about the overvaluation of the
peso, and the threat that it posed on the economy when, inevitably, the peso was subjected to
a corrective devaluation.60 These concerns were rooted in a current account deficit to the tune
of 7 percent of GDP.61
Arguably, however, the most dangerous policy decision was the decision to begin
issuing dollar-denominated instruments of sovereign debt, the infamous tesobonos. As FDI
soared in the early nineties following large-scale privatization, the peso remained fixed to the
dollar in an eﬀort to keep inflation low. In spite of this, the real appreciation of the currency
paired with the entry into force of NAFTA meant that domestic savings were nearly nonexistent, and investors began to suspect that the Mexican economy was not stable enough for
long-term investment. To combat the threat of large-scale capital flight, the government
pushed for foreign investment to shift to dollar-denominated debt. The hope was that the
issuance of tesobonos would instill confidence in the government’s control of the situation. Just
in 1994, the share of Mexico’s outstanding sovereign debt denominated in dollars rose from
6.4 percent at the beginning of the year to nearly two-thirds of total debt by August.62 This
was yet another unsustainable burden on the country’s foreign reserves which would ultimately
lead to capital flight and the risk of a sovereign default.
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Following the debacle of 1994, the Zedillo and his posse of technocrats developed a
concise objective for the country’s economic policy which would inform specific decisions on
monetary policy, budgeting, and eﬀorts to reform various sectors of the economy. As defined
in the General Criteria for Economic Policy for the year 2000, the administration’s economic
strategy consisted of three main pillars of policy implementation: fiscal and monetary
prudence, the strengthening of the country’s financial system, and the push for structural
changes to the national economy.63 In terms of monetary policy, the main adjustment was the
release of the peso’s pegged exchange rate. Along with this, the reorientation of the central
bank’s mission toward the use of monetary policy to target inflation expectations. In financial
sector, the decade following the crisis saw a shift in policies to curb lending, diversify risk,
instill a sense of confidence in the banks’ solvency through capital reserve requirements, and
shift the burden of deposit guarantees from Banxico to the individual institutions. The
structural changes would have come slowly—a constitutional reform package approved in
2014 was the latest in the series of policy instruments aimed at restructuring the Mexican
economy to take advantage of its growth potential.

Curbing monetary policy
One of the first actions taken by Zedillo’s administration was an agreement known as
el Pacto through which the government and leaders of every sector of the Mexican economy
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agreed to do their part to stabilize the Mexican economy which was on the edge of a financial
crisis. As a part of the Pacto, the government agreed on the need to release the crawling band
to a full floating exchange rate regime. During the negotiations, however, it was widely thought
that a sudden release would only further scare the exchange market. To avoid such a shock,
the Exchange Commission decided to widen the band by 15 percent, eﬀective 20 December
1994.64 Within 48 hours, foreign investors had pulled USD 5 billion out of the country
dragging the value of the peso down as they went. On 22 December, Banxico announced it
would release the peso’s peg, which immediately caused a further depreciation in the value of
the peso to the tune of 15 percent, reaching MXN 5.70 to the dollar by 27 December—a loss
of more than 40 percent of the peso’s value against the dollar in the span of a week.65
In the aftermath of the crisis, analysts in academia as well as the business sector agreed
that a pegged exchange rate was little more than an opportunity to draw foreign investment
under the guise of stability at the expense of the central banks.66 Ultimately, the real
appreciation of a currency undermines the peg, the value cannot be maintained, and the
government is held liable when capital flees.67 An additional problem to be resolved with the
peg’s release was conflation of confidence in the Mexican economy with confidence in the
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sustainability of the peg. Mexico was only able to maintain the level of debt it did prior to
1994 because of the relative safety of cetes—peso-denominated debt instruments.68
As outlined by Banco de México in its 1995 Annual Inform, the monetary strategy in
place for the remainder of Zedillo’s sexenio was notable for the shift in emphasis toward the
anchoring of inflation expectations. However, the bank pointed out that using monetary policy
to combat inflation was not a goal in itself: rather it defined it as “an indispensable condition”
to reach the state’s transcendental goals of sustainable and equitable economic growth.69 That
is, the peso’s purchasing power must remain stable in order to focus on strategies to promote
growth in an environment of certainty. The floating exchange rate remains a core part of
Mexico’s economic policy. While the economy is no stranger to volatility, especially in light
of external shocks that may aﬀect investor sentiment,70 the restrained use of monetary policy
has been successful in keeping the value of the peso from nosediving as it did at the end of
1994 (with the 2008 Global Financial Crisis being a notable exception)71.

New rules for the financial sector
Recovery from the crash did not take long: by the third quarter of 1995, seasonallyadjusted GDP was already positive.72 The USD 52 billion rescue package orchestrated by the
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Mexican government, the IMF, and the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury allowed the government
to stay on schedule with interest payments to its creditors, assuage investor fears, and focus its
energy on pulling the country out of its performance slump.73 Once indicators began pointing
towards a recovery, the government began taking steps to regulate and reform internally,
starting with the banking industry.
The lax regulation enjoyed by the newly-privatized domestic banks played a key role
in weakening the financial sector. Among the most salient issues with the regulatory
environment was the degree to which the institutions were lending to individuals and
companies with ties to the bank’s management. These loans had higher default rates and banks
that held these loans tended to engage in even more related lending in an eﬀort to stay afloat
at the onset of investor panic. 74 These connections were not required to be disclosed.
Additionally, accounting standards which were not required to follow international guidelines
hid the banks’ real degree of exposure by understating nonperforming loans. Lastly, as became
evident following the onset of the crisis, the legal framework to deal with the banks which were
going under was lacking, and often times allowed culpable directors to simply walk away.
Following the crisis, Congress and the Zedillo administration worked to implement reforms
that would address these concerns.
The first part of the reforms aimed at incentivizing self-imposed market discipline by
institutions of credit. This included the 1999 Law for the Protection of Bank Savings. With
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its implementation, Fobaproa was dismantled and replaced by the Bank Savings Protection
Institute (IPAB). Unlike its predecessor, IPAB capped deposit insurance at about USD
130,000 per individual, per IPAB protected institution.75 Later, in 2003, the CNBV (born of
the merger of the CNB with its securities counterpart), on the question of information
disclosure, established regulations to normalize the reporting of investment, derivative, and
financial performance information, as well as information about internal control and risk.76
Additional reforms included revisions to the regulation of accounting practices to follow
international standards, the establishment of regulation to ensure suﬃcient liquidity by banks
with foreign liabilities, and reforms to corporate governance, which gave shareholders legal
grounds to be aware of, and thus responsible for, the decisions taken internally.
On the side of the framework in which banks operated, bankruptcy and insolvency
legislation were given a lot of work. The Ley de Quiebras y Suspensión de Pagos (Bankruptcy and
Payment Suspension Law) was scrapped and replaced with the Ley de Concursos Mercantiles
(Commercial Bankruptcy Law) in May of 2000. The most notable development as a result was
the establishment of an independent institution, Ifecom,77 an autonomous agency of the
Federal Judiciary Council, to address bankruptcy protection claims more eﬃciently than
previously. Moreover, laws were amended to prioritize the interest of the creditors in
insolvency disputes,78 preventing the processes from dragging out and encouraging institutions
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to expand credit.79 Moreover, strict regulations were established for banks to take preemptive
action should capital inadequacy symptoms arise.80
All of these changes which have taken place as late as a decade after the crisis, have
served to strengthen the financial sector in Mexico. There certainly remains ample room for
improvement—competition remains low and access to credit is restricted because of excessive
cautiousness, stringent regulations, and a combination of mistrust of and lack of familiarity
with financial institutions. However, the general view is that the country’s macroeconomic
fundamentals as well as the strength of its private industries have solidified since the crisis.
These achievements were in no small part the result of the fiscal, monetary, and regulatory
discipline—self-imposed and external—which Mexico pursued in the short- and mediumterm following its close encounter with sovereign default.
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IV. Current policies and economic outlook
Expectations for growth
Unlike the growth seen in the decade following the Tequila Crisis, Mexico’s
economic performance in the last six years has been underwhelming at best. When compared
to the rest of the emerging markets, Mexico’s growth tracks more closely the OECD average
annual rates. Since the passing of 13 reforms aimed at tapping into the economy’s potential,
growth has remained sluggish, oscillating between 2 and 3 percent annually. In spite of this,
international organizations and academics alike keep a positive outlook for Mexico’s growth.
In the last two years, realized growth has exceeded Banxico and the IMF’s forecasts by as
much as half a percentage point. Policymakers and academics point to this as proof of the
country’s solid macroeconomic fundamentals and strengthening resilience. Moreover, the
U.S. Presidential Election of 2016, the threat of a trade war with the country’s largest trading
partner, the uncertainty generated by the continuing security issues internally, and
corruption scandals notwithstanding, Mexico’s economy continues to expand. Recent
reforms have started to bear fruit in the form of an expanded credit market, increased
competition in domestic industries for the benefit of consumers, and the entry of the private
sector into high-value activities in the energy sector. Additionally, high value-added exports
are an increasingly large portion of the country’s gross domestic product, as domestic and
foreign investment continues to expand with a focus on domestic industry and original
research and development (R&D).
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Looking at labor and population statistics, the current sexenio has been noteworthy in
its commitment to labor formalization, a key factor in the country’s lag in productivity.
Oﬃcial unemployment figures for those aged 15 and up have fallen to 3.13 percent at the
end of 2017, the lowest level seen since 2006.81 Moreover, in the first 5 years of the
administration, the private sector has added a record of 3,461,055 new formal jobs.82 This
brings the total proportion of people employed in the informal sector to 26.8 percent of
employed persons at the end of 2017. However, the figure is not without qualification: 56.8
percent of employed persons aged 15 and up participate in informal employment. 83
The general situation of the economy, however, remains one of uncertainty and tepid
growth prospects. Rising inflation has been answered by hikes to the overnight interbank
lending rate by Banxico, reaching 4.69 percent in January of 2018. This means that the
expansion of private credit is likely to level oﬀ in 2018. On the public front, the Peña Nieto
administration has undertaken an far-reaching fiscal consolidation project aimed at
rebalancing the government’s finances by expanding tax revenues and curtailing public
spending, Additionally, the general elections in July of 2018, where a populist, protectionist
platform leads in the polls, has generated enough uncertainty to keep growth expectations for
2018 at a meager 2.24 percent—below the OECD average of 2.36 percent, and far below
the prospects for similar countries such as Colombia (2.91), Turkey (4.91), and Indonesia
(5.16). The forecast for 2019 is only 9 basis points higher.84
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Policy performance 2012 – 2018
The beginning of the current administration’s activity was marked by a boost in
confidence from the private and international audiences following Mexican politics. President
Peña Nieto’s platform, focused largely on the country’s economic development, drew applause
from international observers who commended the government’s commitment to reforms to
improve the country’s trade liberalization and degree of economic participation. Indeed,
between 2013 and 2016, Mexico led the OECD countries in reform activities, implementing
just under 50 percent of the policy recommendations set for by the organization in the Going
for Growth report—a wide margin over the organization average of 30 percent. Among the
most welcome reforms were the fiscal reform, and those of the energy and telecommunications
sectors.85 The reforms, however, have delivered mixed results.
In 2013, in the first volume of its annual economic outlook report, the OECD
suggested that the reforms would “raise sustainable long-term growth prospects.”86 At the time,
the more important concern for observers and domestic policymakers alike was the retention
of core levels of inflation at or below target.87 Investors expected a rise in inflation as a result
of an economic boom following the reforms’ implementation. This upturn in inflation
expectations did not much aﬀect medium-term growth prospects. The same year, GDP growth
forecasts by investors surveyed in December by the central bank predicted slow growth for
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2013 (survey average of 1.3 percent), followed by a sharp jump to 3.41 percent in 2014, 3.97
for 2015, and 4.14 for 2016(!).88 Even then, Banxico reported additionally a concern over the
country’s economic context as a result of the implementation of the fiscal reform, the country’s
public security problem and, most importantly, the expectation that foreign demand would
slow (as it has) along with a global economic downturn.89 The eﬀects of the global economic
slump have evidently had a greater impact on realized growth. Paired with the political risks
associated with the US election in 2016 and the current renegotiation of NAFTA, growth has
far underperformed vis-à-vis expectations at the beginning of the sexenio.
Since its implementation, the telecommunications reform has been among the most
successful. The reform was aimed primarily at breaking the duopoly that the Spanish
conglomerate Telefónica and Carlos Slim’s América Móvil exercised on the market—while
only 44 percent of the population has access to fixed-line telephone service, compared to a 94
percent penetration of mobile providers.90 As far as market competition is concerned, as of
2017, Telcel remains the largest mobile provider, concentrating 64 percent of the market.
However, this represents the smallest market share for the company in the last two years.
AT&T, on the other hand, closed the year with over 15 million subscribers (representing 13
percent of the market), nearly double those reported at the end of 2015. Average revenue per
user just in 2017 fell about 10 percent, suggesting the increased competition continues to place
downward pressure on prices, which will ultimate benefit the customers and incentivize
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business to further invest in expanding access.91 However, the reform also included provisions
to entirely phase out analog systems, a move which succeeded in fully digitalizing all TV signals
nationwide. However, this process, like much of the implementation of the reforms, was
riddled with accusations of corruption. An investigation by The Wall Street Journal surfaced
claims of bribery, extortion on behalf of government oﬃcials, and mismanagement of funds
in the acquisition of the digital systems provided by the government.92 Other reforms have
been less successful to diﬀerent degrees, ranging from insuﬃcient results, to deadly riots
following the implementation.
The fiscal reform, one of the most controversial for relying heavily on those who already
contributed in the largest amounts to the government’s budget,93 was nonetheless one of the
most successful. 94 Given the precipitous drop in oil prices since the beginning of the current
administration, the increase of over 3.4 percentage points between 2013 and 2016 in tax
revenues as a percentage of GDP helped the government maintain a balanced budget,95 a
hallmark of public finances in Mexico since the crisis of 1994. The downside to a balanced
budget, however, is that it by definition implied either high taxes to subsidize broad
government services to the community, or it presupposes a severe lack of public spending. In
Mexico’s case it is the latter. As pointed out by Manuel J. Molano, Deputy Director General
of IMCO (Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad), this lack of investment has precluded
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Mexico’s capacity to develop high-skill industries to the degree that Korea or Turkey, for
instance, have been able to do in the same period of time.96 This suggests that fiscal reform will
be a continuing topic of interest for the following administration, and a priority if the
government is to seriously commit to investing in domestic growth.
The landmark reform for the Peña Nieto government, however, has been the Energy
Reform. Oil production in Mexico had been on a steady decline since 2004.97 The reform was
a multifaceted piece of legislation which included the liberalization of oil prices, leaving them
at the mercy of the markets; the entry of private enterprise into virtually every aspect of energy
production, from petroleum exploration, extraction, transport, refining, and the sale of the
product and all its derivatives. On the electric energy side, private firms can now compete in
the production and distribution of electricity, and the participation in the development of
renewable energy has been subjected to a similar process of bidding, open to the private sector,
as the petroleum industry did. While remaining (more) autonomous public entities, Pemex
and CFE will have to compete on equal grounding with private corporations and international
conglomerates.98 As a result, the U.S. Energy Information Administration expects oil
production in Mexico will again begin to increase by 2018.99 In spite of the expected benefits
to public resources, as well as the important role the reform has played in the current
administration’s publicity, the reform will likely not bear significant fruit until considerably in
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late into the next administration. What may come even later are the reductions in government
waste and money lost to embezzlement within the giant, that have plagued Pemex in recent
years, which are estimated to have cost the firm—indeed, Mexico—nearly USD 12 billion
between 2003 and 2012.100

Insulating Mexico from the U.S.
As mentioned earlier, one of Mexico’s most important weaknesses are the country’s
reliance on the United States as a consumer of its exports and the threats associated with U.S.
monetary, fiscal, economic, and foreign policy decisions as they relate to Mexico and the
bilateral relationship between the two. A look at the impact of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis
on Mexico shows some of the weaknesses in Mexico’s contemporary relationship with the
United States. Several policy decisions as well as trends in Mexico’s commercial relationship
with the global markets compounded to make Mexico the single most aﬀected country in the
developing world. 101
One of the most notable liabilities in Mexico’s trade policy has been its heavy
dependence on demand from the United States’ internal market.102 While trade liberalization
practices have successfully incentivized foreign investment and the free flow of goods, the large

100

Gabriel Toledo Guerreo, Corruption in the Mexican Energy Industry: Recommendations and Proposals,
(Washington: Wilson Center/Mexico Institute, 2016).
101
Gerardo Esquivel, “Mexico’s Recovery from the Global Financial Crisis”, in Unexpected Outcomes: How
Emerging Economies Survived the Global Financial Crisis, edited by Carol Wise, Leslie Elliott Armijo, and Saori
N. Katada, Brookings Institution Press (2015): 185.
102
Juan Pablo Soriano, “Dilma Y México: Altibajos En Una Relación Indispensable Para América Latina /
Dilma and Mexico: The Ups and Downs of a Crucial Relation for Latin America”, Revista CIDOB D'afers
Internacionals, no. 97/98, CIDOB (2012): 140.

46

majority of this has been carried out with the United States. It is true that Mexican commercial
policy has focused on a diversification of both its commercial oﬀer and its network of trade.
As of today, Mexico has reached a total of 24 free trade or economic integration agreements
signed with other countries or country groupings, as well as participation in three of the most
important multilateral organisms.103 And yet, as of 2016 (the latest available data from the
World Bank), out of Mexico’s exports, valued at USD 373.9 billion, a troubling 81.03 percent
(or USD 302.9 billion) went to the United States, up from the 80.3 percent consumed by the
U.S. in 2014. More importantly, the number has hardly changed since the beginning of
neoliberalism in Mexico. After 1994 and the signing of NAFTA, the percent of the country’s
exports which headed to its northern partner only grew, peaking at 88.4 percent in 1999,
dropping a couple of points, only to rebound to 88.5 percent in 2005.104
While the numbers have indeed dropped since, an eight-point drop in the amount of
exports which go to the United States still leave that market with the lion’s share of the
country’s trade balance, and a dangerous liability in situations such as the one presented during
the 2008 GFC. By the middle of 2009, Mexico’s trade balance had fallen by nearly 35 percent
annually owing to the fall in U.S. demand. That year, GDP contracted by a formidable 6
percent, the largest market contraction in modern Mexican history since the 1994 Peso
Crisis.105
Beyond situations of crisis, the political situation in the United States since 2016 have
served as evidence that demand and the monetary policy emanating from the Fed are not the
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only impact the U.S. can have on Mexico. If the bilateral relationship had been friendly until
the 2016 election cycle, it has since become clear that policymakers in Mexico cannot count
on that being the case. As consequence, the Secretary of the Economy, Ildefonso Guajardo,
has been one of the most visual personae in Mexican politics in 2017. Despite not being in the
running for this year’s presidential election, Guajardo has taken the role of the chief negotiator
for Mexico on numerous fronts as a means to diversify Mexican trade. While Secretary of
Foreign Aﬀairs Luis Videgaray Caso has led the NAFTA renegotiations for Mexico, the
Secretariat of the Economy has team laying the foundation for stronger ties to Europe, Asia,
Latin America, and the CTPP.
In the Old World, Mexico is close to concluding a significant update to the EUMexico FTA, which will aim to add an IP section, including a subsection outlining
geographical indication protection for Mexican goods in Europe and vice versa.106 Given the
importance of intellectual property protection for European firms seeking to expand into
developing markets, the promise of legal protections from Mexico could signal an added boost
of trade and investment from the region, which already includes Mexico’s second largest FDI
source, Spain.107 Additionally, the access to the European market for Mexican agricultural
goods is lauded as one of the most logical alternatives for the same exports currently directed
at the U.S.

106

Secretaría de Economía, Consulta sobre Indicaciones Geográficas en el marco de la Modernización del
TLCUEM, Secretaría de Economía, August 2017.
107
Ana Carolina Garriga, “Inversión extranjera directa en México: comparación entre la inversión procedente
de los Estados Unidos y del resto del mundo,” Foro Internacional 57, no. 2, (abril-junio, 2017).

48

On the Pacific front, since the collapse of the TPP negotiations due to the U.S. pulling
out of the treaty, have already implemented a near-identical agreement with the exclusion of
22 provisions which the U.S. had forced in. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement
for Transpacific Partnership was signed by the 11 members on 8 March of this year and will
enter into force a short two months after at least six states ratify it.108 The treaty raises the
number of countries with whom Mexico has free trade arrangements to 52, keeping it at the
helm of free trade globally.109 Encompassing 13.5 percent of global GDP, both the
participating countries and observers have commented on the potential success of the treaty in
expanding trade between some of the largest emerging markets.
In addition to transoceanic negotiations, Mexico has been busy at work developing
closer relationships with Latin America. The Pacific Alliance, in force since 2012, has included
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Singapore as Associated States to further integrate the
current members—Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru—to its counterparts around the
Pacific. With respect to Argentina and Brazil, expansion of the Economic Complementation
Agreements (ACE) which aim to eventually reduce all tariﬀ barriers to trade between Mexico
and the two South American giants, is expected to be completed by June of this year as well.110
All of these fronts combined, it is clear that the Mexican government has taken to heart
the necessity to diversify its trade balance to steer away from dependence on the U.S. On the
other hand, there is a long way between goals and the reality, and Mexico is in a diﬃcult
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position because of the physical proximity to the U.S. and the large proportion of Mexican
immigrants and their descendants who now live in the U.S., which make it diﬃcult to take a
180-degree turn. All things considered however, there is certainly room for improvement in
terms of global connectivity and economic diversification.

Arrested productivity
Researchers as well as international organizations alike have been steadfast in their
identification of weak productivity as one of the country’s most important challenges today.
Productivity has stagnated since 1990, growing only 4.5 percent in the span of 23 years111 and,
as of 2017, remains at USD 18.80 per hour worked, giving Mexico the lowest rate of
productivity of all OECD countries.112 The reasons for this are varied: since the beginning of
the economic liberalization of the 1980s, the increase in Mexico’s economic competitiveness
has been beneficial primarily to the accumulation of wealth for the primary producers. While
wages and productivity grew alongside each other prior to 1976, since then, the participation
of wages in the country’s GDP composition has fallen to 18.9 percent. Manufacturing and
exports, on the other hand, have increased to represent nearly two fifths of the country’s
GDP.113 This separation of wages doubles its eﬀect on productivity when compounded with
the stagnation of the minimum wage. Within Latin America, Mexico boasts the second highest
level of productivity (following Chile) but the third lowest minimum wage (only Bolivia and
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Nicaragua rank lower).114 Additional obstacles to the growth of productivity to levels
comparable to the rest of the OECD countries include labor informality, the existing tax
burden on individuals and corporations, wage stagnation, bureaucratic hurdles to enterprise,
as well as the ineﬃcient allocation of foreign direct investment.

Employment informality
As discussed above, informally employed individuals in the Mexican economy present
an overbearing participation among the employed population. However, the way in which it
is defined is important in providing a way to address it. The distinction between the informal
sector and informal employment is a crucial one. The ILO’s Oﬃce of International Labor
defines the informal sector as the grouping of units of production (read: businesses) not
registered under a country’s legal framework.115 In the case of Mexico, this means that the
business is not an oﬃcial entity under the Tax Administration Service (SAT), and its employees
are not beneficiaries of the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS), the national institute
responsible for providing health services and social protection to all private-sector employees
in Mexico. However, the size of the informal sector in the country underestimates the total
number of persons who are informally employed. This figure also includes people who are
indeed earning wages, often times employed by a formal enterprise, but who are not subject
to a contract or employment agreement which provides them with access to IMSS benefits and
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leaves them outside the country’s oﬃcial employment framework. Among Mexican workers,
only 26.8 percent are employed in the informal sector. However, this ignores the fact that over
half of the country’s economically active population is not entitled to social security and other
benefits as a part of their labor contracts, even when they are indeed employed by formal firms
or organizations. The high degree of informal employment in the formal sector suggests there
are other avenues to increased productivity growth beyond the creation of formal jobs. Within
the formal sector itself, there needs to be an implementation of reforms or more stringent
regulations to prevent loose employment arrangements which allow employers to fill positions
with undercompensated workers. Such arrangements provide an additional loophole for firms
to sidestep tax expenses. This, in turn, continues to keep tax revenues below potential given
the size of the economy, further constraining the government’s capacity to invest in growth.
Employment informality, in all of its flavors, presents one of the biggest obstacles to
productivity. Workers have little in the way of legal protection against employers, who can use
this to widen profit margins at the expense of the workers. The broadest section of the informal
sector consists of micro-enterprises, which are the least productive of all OECD countries. This
means that the high-degree of informality is keeping a sizeable proportion of the country’s
human capital and physical resources away from more productive industries.116 Wages are
further reduced from spending on social services—in particular, those which are typically
provided by the IMSS. Additionally, escaping informal employment can prove diﬃcult, given
the disconnect between workers coming from an informal job and the skills or experience often
required by the formal labor market. This ensures that, in addition to an obstacle to
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productivity, informality becomes a trap for those who have been forced into it to support
themselves.117
An additional challenge to portraying an accurate picture of labor informality in the
Mexican economy is the exclusion of agricultural workers from the criteria that make up either
the informal sector or informally employed persons.118 Given the importance of the
agricultural industry for large swaths of the country’s population as well as the high degree of
marginalization among agricultural workers, the criteria to define the phenomenon of
informality makes even the broadest definition of the term insuﬃcient to quantify the scale of
real informality in the economy.

Foreign direct investment allocation
One of the most important sources of capital for any developing country are cash flows
from foreign direct investment (FDI). As mentioned in the previous chapter, capital from FDI
is a much more stable and permanent source of investment for a country than portfolio
investment. Unlike the latter, FDI is employed in value creation processes, producing benefits
for both the sender country as well as the host country. Even before NAFTA’s ratification,
FDI has been flowing relatively consistently into Mexico, providing an additional source of
income to sustain the country’s running current account deficit.119 However, the shape FDI
has taken once it arrives in Mexico, as well as the industries targeted by foreign capital providers
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when investing in the country, have changed dramatically over the last half century. Mexico’s
first sign of opening to foreign investment was the establishment of maquiladoras across the
country’s northern states, primarily concentrated along transportation routes leading into the
United States. The primary purpose of maquiladoras was to turn materials into finished
products for consumption or further assembly in the U.S. Over the course of the years, and
especially since Mexico’s economic opening, FDI has morphed into a way of providing capital
for the growth of domestic industry, and today is an important source of financing for projects
ranging from petroleum extraction to aerospace engineering, to digital architecture design, to
domestic and foreign auto industry development and production.
Important factors in determining the outcomes associated with FDI are the
institutional and legal frameworks in place to regulate it, as well business and investment
incentives for investors, the characteristics of the target industry, and the available
infrastructure, technological, and human capabilities to maximize the capital productivity of
the investment.120 All of these have to work in tandem to ensure that FDI is not limited to
extractive industries which have a negligible impact on the host country’s GDP.121 This has
become particularly diﬃcult following the Uruguay Round of 1994 and the negotiations that
produced the agreements necessary to establish the WTO. In these negotiations, developing
countries were prohibited from using several policy tools which would facilitate the country’s
ability to meet its objectives for the FDI captured.122 For Mexico, much of the framework was
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developed during the last fifteen years of the XX century—NAFTA, the reversal of nationalistic
policies, IP protection, and the loosening of regulations for technological transactions has led
to private, foreign investors being at the helm of investment in Mexico. So much so, that as
late as 2001, Mexico still captured as much as 35 percent of FDI inflows into Latin America.123
Several recent studies have suggested that FDI indeed has a broad, positive impact on
key economic indicators, notably, real GDP and the country’s balance of trade. Moreover,
there is evidence that there is significant impact on domestic investment as a spillover from
FDI entering the country.124 When firms financed by foreign capital enter the market,
investment from domestically financed firms spurs to better compete against the new players.125
While the domestic benefits are broad, however, it is important to note that these benefits are
not universal. As explained before, the proper framework to promote productive investment
must be in place to ensure the benefits are shared between the capital provider and the host
country. Additionally, even with the proper framework in place, FDI can only have significant
spillover when the gap in technology between firms operating directly on foreign capital and
domestic firms is narrow enough that the spread of knowledge—vertically or horizontally in
the form of domestic sourcing, cooperation agreements, mergers, imitation or
demonstration—happens organically.126
All of this is suggestive of a continued strengthening of the economy, given the country
can continue to attract investment in the scale it has up to this point. That task, however, has
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become evidently a more challenging one in recent years. Since reaching a high-point in 2011,
FDI in Latin America has fallen consistently—by 2016, FDI in the region stood at USD 167.2
billion, 16.9 percent lower than the USD 206.9 billion received five years prior. Mexico, in
particular, has been hard hit by the fall in FDI. Today, the country continues to receive 19
percent of the region’s inflows—less than half of Brazil’s share (47 percent). However, on a
year-to-year basis, FDI in Mexico from 2015 to 2016 fell by 7.9 percent.127
As it relates to low productivity, FDI presents a nuanced picture. On the one hand,
research into the factors of location for FDI firms converges on the idea that Mexico is an
attractive destination for its proximity to the United States, the sizeable domestic market, and
the attractive wage level as a cost-saving strategy. Indeed, the states capturing the largest share
of FDI have historically been Mexico City (formerly, the Federal District), home to a fifth of
the country’s population, and the states sharing a border with the U.S.128 Paired with the
positive eﬀects on indicators and the possibility of economic spillover, further accommodating
domestic economic policy to attract larger amounts of FDI to the rest of the country would
seem like a reasonable strategy to pursue.

Wage stagnation
Arguably, the most challenging obstacle for Mexico’s economic prospects is wage
stagnation across the board. Since the ratification of NAFTA, Mexico’s daily minimum wage
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has been 8.6 percent that of the United States, when adjusted for historical exchange rates.129
Despite near annual increases to the national minimum wage, purchasing power remains more
or less identical to what it was 20 years prior. On the measure of real income, with the
exception of highly specialized professionals in globally interconnected industries—e.g.,
aerospace, information technology, and finance—workers across the country at all income
levels have seen a decrease in their real wages since 2006, the only G-20 emerging economy to
have seen such a trend.130
After the full liberalization of trade, U.S. firms have taken advantage of Mexico’s low
wages to outsource production and widen profit margins. On Mexico’s side, policymakers who
advocated for the benefits of the treaty for the country largely focused on large FDI inflows
and increased foreign demand as the primary aims of the country’s commercial opening. As
time has passed, however, it has become evident that this is not suﬃcient. Because policy has
largely ignored the domestic front, public and domestic private investment in Mexico has been
disappointingly low, in part due to low credit-access, and thus wages across the board have
remained insuﬃcient.131 In addition, if foreign firms are attracted to the country because of low
wages, the reliance on large, foreign investment inflows suggests FDI could be an obstacle to,
more than simply a distraction from generalized increases in income. Domestic producers are
incentivized to keep wages low to remain an attractive location for foreign production.
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Current economic outlook
In the context of the current political and economic atmosphere, resilience has become
Mexico’s hallmark.132 If fiscal restraint has hurt the government’s ability to encourage
investment and spur growth through public spending, credit rating agencies have certainly
looked upon Mexico with kind eyes as a result of it. Even amidst the threat of a partial reversal
of the achievements of the energy reform should López Obrador succeed in July’s elections,133
as well as the aforementioned renegotiation of NAFTA, ratings agencies have largely
maintained a stable outlook for Mexico’s ability to fulfill its debt obligations. Nonetheless,
Fitch has advised caution in light of financial volatility which may come as a result of the
electoral process.
Inflation expectations remain anchored, even after the December departure of the
governor of the Bank of Mexico. While realized inflation has spiked in the past year, it is again
on a downward trend, and there is little doubt of the central bank’s commitment and ability
to keep it at sustainable levels. However, above-target inflation remains an obstacle to domestic
consumption growth. In 2018, domestic demand is expected to grow only 1.7 percent,
suggesting wage growth is not enough to make up for the rise in prices and boost spending.134
Moreover, to keep inflation under wraps, the central bank has had to push interest rates to
levels which have placed a strain on private investment.135 Lending remains low, in spite of the
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expanded access to capital. However, the realization of investment commitments following the
auctioning of lucrative energy sector contracts are expected to foster growth in the next few
years.136
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V. Policy case assessment
Diﬀusion theory
The Washington Consensus, and by extension economic neoliberalism, has long been
the golden standard of developmental economics from a Western perspective, even after it was
partially disavowed by its original author. The consensus is built on the theory of a convergence
of ideologies toward a common set of reform areas which in turn are expected to realize a
country’s economic potential. The main critics of the Washington Consensus pointed out that,
to a large degree, the points of the consensus were being imposed on the countries rather than
chosen through rational economic analysis. Irrespective of their origin, it is generally true that
as more and more countries saw quantifiable benefits from the implementation of policies in
line with the consensus, other countries around them increasingly adopted policy agendas that
mirrored those of the former.137
This spread of similar policies is the core of the theory of policy diﬀusion. Rather than
an imposition of a policy agenda, as the critics of the Washington Consensus would argue, the
theory of diﬀusion suggests that as a state implements policies or structures which are successful
in achieving a stated goal, neighboring—or distant, but metrically similar—countries will
implement policies and structures which mirror that strategy. Diﬀusion, then, suggests that
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neoliberalism has been less a purposeful eﬀort of policy-alignment and rather an organic
policy-adoption process based on rationality.138
An additional dimension to policy diﬀusion theory is the model introduced by Chares
Tiebout in 1956 of competition among local government jurisdictions. Notably, his model
suggested that the formation and change over time in policy in a certain jurisdiction was
impacted by the relative success of policies elsewhere and a desire to imitate success, but also
by a sense of competition for residents.139 In Tiebout’s domestic model, policymakers contend
for spending and tax revenue from residents who have free movement. Extrapolating the
concept of competition in policy diﬀusion to the international level, a contest for foreign direct
investment and the creation of business to promote local spending may be motivating factors
in how policy is developed with relationship to that of other countries.
To develop a comprehensive and substantive set of policy recommendations for
Mexico, then, requires case assessments of diﬀerent economic policies which may provide a
roadmap for Mexico beyond 2018. Of particular interest are policies which have been
implemented in countries with comparable economic conditions, aimed at addressing the
primary areas of concern outlined in the previous chapter. These case assessments will take into
account the stated goal of the policy, the implementation process, and the short- and longterm impact of its implementation on the economy as measured by the appropriate indicators.
However, analyzing the potential impact of international and domestic policy models
cannot be done uniformly. For the purpose of assessing the success of any policy, it is important
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to distinguish between those which have been implemented in Mexico—successfully or not—
and those which can potentially be replicated, but which nevertheless were implemented in a
diﬀerent context. This contextualization allows for the assessment to address potential
weaknesses arising from exogenous factors in an economic policy model adapted from an
authoritarian regime, for instance.

Domestic policy cases
In approaching examples of domestic policy, there are two main questions to answer:
(1) which policies have been the most successful in bringing about the desired outcome? And
(2) what about the policy itself or the framework for implementation diﬀerentiated it from less
successful policy endeavors? The selection of cases to consider will provide a response to the
former, and the cases themselves will answer the latter.

Financial re-regulation and related reforms
Among the most important items of Mexico’s domestic policy agenda in recent history,
and one with resounding economic repercussions, was the strengthening of regulations
surrounding the financial sector following the crisis of 1994. As outlined in chapter I, the
sudden hemorrhage of portfolio capital from the Mexican Stock Exchange following the onset
of investor panic in December of that year strained domestic banks beyond their operational
breaking point. To stay afloat, management at several financial institutions chose to engage in
related lending, a practice virtually inseparable from loan default because of the lack of proper
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due diligence at issuance. When the institutions did go under, there was little prosecution for
reckless management, and the depositors bore the burden of the bankruptcies.
Banks were able to do this because of the severe regulatory void in the financial sector
following the privatization of the sector in the three years prior. At the time, there were no
standardized financial reporting requirements, no requirements to disclose the interests of the
banks’ management, and no requirements to report on internal control and risk. On the legal
side, the extant Bankruptcy and Payment Suspension Law was not far-reaching enough to
adequately punish culpable directors, nor was it paired with eﬀective institutions which could
uphold the letter of the law. As a result, engaging in moral hazard became commonplace
among the leadership of the financial sector. Finally, the Salinas administration was not a mere
victim of unscrupulous financial directors. In many ways, it was the deregulation of the early
90s and the administration’s refusal to act against the private sector—for fear of unnerving
foreign capital providers—that allowed for these conditions to remain the status quo. While
the privatization had been rife with irregularities, the government had an unoﬃcial policy of
turning a blind eye to the sector. At the same time, to induce confidence in an industry it knew
well to be unstable, Banxico legitimized the banks and their activities by guaranteeing virtually
all banks’ liabilities through Fobaproa with funds it knew well were no longer there.
To a large degree, the weaknesses in the financial sector were one of the primary drivers
of investor panic in the run-up to December of 1994. While the issuance of tesobonos and the
political shocks of the year contributed to the country’s weakened financial position, the
private banking sector had grown large enough to drag down the country’s entire economy
with it if it failed. For this reason, regulating the sector and introducing strict standards,
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comprehensive oversight, and severe legal consequences for noncompliance of norms were
central to stabilizing the country’s macroeconomic foundation in the years following the crisis.
The package of policies enacted in the aftermath of the crisis was aimed at tackling
three main axes as defined by José J. Sidaoui:140
1. Stabilizing the economy as quickly as possible to avoid a relapse,
2. Realigning the structure of incentives for negligent or perverse behavior within the
banking industry, and
3. Strengthening the legal and regulatory framework so ensure the execution of the
law regarding the financial sector.
Financial re-regulation has been primarily aimed at addressing the second axis. These
policies have been remarkable in the speed with which they have produced change in the
economy. Especially considering the haste in which they were passed. With a government
composed overwhelmingly of highly-educated technocrats, Zedillo’s administration and the
federal dependencies during his sexenio were swift in implementing policies they considered
prudent for the situation. Even since the beginning of political alternation with Fox’s electoral
victory in 2000, the dependencies of the Secretariat of Finance continue to be staﬀed by
economic and finance professionals whose primary objective is the stability of the Mexican
financial system.
While the package as a whole addressed several deficiencies in the practices of industry
participants, a majority of the standards and requirements introduced through the package
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were basic regulations that addressed the core failings of the financial system when banks were
privatized in the first half of the decade. These included logical capital adequacy rules,
“prudential” regulation to ensure private bank liquidity, an adoption of international
accounting standards, the establishment of limits on deposit insurance, and the elimination of
limits to foreign ownership in the industry.141
However, two of the policies included in the package have been paramount in
improving economic conditions in Mexico since then. The first was the separation of the
National Banking Credit Information Service (Senicreb) from its role as a credit bureau.
Rather, the institution, a public registry maintained and managed by the federal government
through the Secretary of Finance and the Bank of Mexico, is relegated to gathering information
for the government to maintain oversight over the industry without much intervention. At the
same time, the new legal framework allowed the private sector to participate in the gathering
and dissemination of credit information through the creation of private credit information
associations (sociedades de información crediticia, SICs).142
The second policy which has yielded considerable results was the implementations of
norms for corporate governance in financial institutions. Among these norms was the issuance
of an entire document titled “General Dispositions Applicable to the Financial Information of
Credit Institutions, oﬃcially encoded into law by Congress in 2005.143 At its latest
amendment, enacted on 14 March 2018, the disposition is made up of 786 pages of legislation
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in five titles, two of which outline the exact financial information that must be disclosed by
each institution and the regulatory reports that each institution operating in the private credit
market in Mexico must undergo. Moreover, the document outlines the way in which the
information can and should be presented, and even includes clauses regulating valuation and
the use of information as a tool of financial behavior.144 Even beyond the regulatory framework
regarding which activities can be carried out legally, the value of this section of the document
is clear.
Transparency, in private as in public matters, is key in preventing perverse behavior.
Moreover, transparency is the key to competitiveness, a positive attribute in either the political
or economic development of a country. Peter Druker in 1985 outlined the importance of
competition in the development of a healthy environment of innovation and
entrepreneurship.145 The correlation has only been reinforced since. Moreover, informational
asymmetry is one of the most important hindrances to optimal decision-making. From a
financial consumer perspective, reducing that asymmetry has in other cases contributed to a
generalized fall in prices and granting financially “unsophisticated” investors access to financial
markets—some academics suggest that indeed, the purpose of financial regulation is in fact a
tool in the redistribution of wealth.146 Even if redistribution is not the primary goal of policies
to improve transparency, the argument gives weight to the value of such policies for social
wellbeing. On the other hand, transparency in the private sector can have serious implications
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for corruption which, as mentioned earlier, is one of the biggest challenges still facing Mexico
today—disclosure of key financial information, as well as details regarding contractual ties of
a person, moral or physical, to another through financial transactions bring to light potential
conflicts of interest among policymakers, deterring the incentive to pursue dishonest projects
with public resources. Furthermore, the implementation of requirements which compel
financial institutions to disclose information to the general public ensures that a public agency
or dependency will be unable to abuse its monopoly on financial information control its
dissemination for private gain.147
All around, the passage of several new pieces of legislation, the establishment of
competent bodies to tighten the regulatory environment, and the continued commitment to
transparency in financial reporting have introduced a high degree of trust in the financial
industry. The public and private sectors alike have taken note of the continuous improvement
to the framework of the financial system since 1995. These developments have led to a stable
and highly liquid financial market which acts as a counterweight in situations where financial
instability is introduced through external shocks.148

A perfect float
Mexico’s floating exchange rate regime, established following the release of the peg
after the December Error, has been one of the hallmarks of Mexican economic policy in recent
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economic history. On the one hand, it is a policy that was modelled in stark contradiction to
what Williamson proposed in the Washington Consensus. In fact, by the time the original
article was written, there was a general agreement that a successful exchange rate regime would
have to be either a peg strictly defended (read: currency boards), or a full float with no
monetary intervention other than for the purpose of anchoring inflation expectations. 149 On
the other, the regime has been notorious for being the foundation of Mexico’s macroeconomic
stability. Despite some criticism in the last two years following the peso’s nosedive following
the U.S. election of 2016, domestic analysts agree that the regime should not be reversed to
defend the value of the peso from further devaluation. This agreement has been twice notably
contravened in recent years.
In December of 2014, faced with the crash in oil prices and given the government’s
continued reliance on crude sales for the bulk of the federal budget, the Exchange
Commission—an organism composed of the Secretary and Under-secretary of Finance, a
second under-secretary of the Finance Ministry, the Governor and two board-members of the
Bank of Mexico—announced daily auctions of up to USD 200 million in foreign reserves with
a minimum price of the prior day’s exchange rate plus 1.5 percent. As expressed by the press
release, the intention of the policy was to ensure liquidity if necessary in the exchange markets
in periods of high financial volatility.150 In March of 2015, the Commission announced that
the government would oﬀer an additional USD 52 million daily with no price minimum.151

149

Williamson, 1476.
Banco de México, La Comisión de Cambios adopta medidas preventivas para proveer liquidez al mercado
cambiario, comunicado de prensa (12/08/2014).
151
Banco de México, La Comisión de Cambios adopta medidas preventivas adicionales para proveer liquidez al
mercado cambiario, comunicado de prensa (03/11/2015).
150

68

While the express reasoning was to hedge against market volatility, the underlying reasoning
is clear. An accelerated devaluation of the currency puts in doubt the central bank’s ability to
curb inflation and undermines the government’s ability to service foreign currencydenominated debt—two factors which were at the heart of the crisis of 1994. The daily
auctions of USD 200 million were discontinued in November of the same year, and the
remaining USD 52 million-a-day auctions ran through February of 2016.152
Even then, the logic behind the implementation of FX auctions as a short-term tool to
combat volatility was well-grounded in the country’s macroeconomic doctrine of monetary
policy restraint. While the intervention in exchange markets was indeed aimed at defending
the peso’s value, it was not to support an artificially high value of the currency, but rather to
combat upward inflationary pressures that could have had serious impacts on real incomes for
the economy at large. Moreover, the International Monetary Fund sanctioned the policies—
the SDR 62.4 billion credit option extended to Mexico as a part of the fund’s reform in lending
for the purpose of crisis prevention in 2009 was renewed in 2017, reinforcing the country’s
record of stability and fiscal discipline, as well as the expectation that the country will maintain
such policies.153 As a way of providing additional reassurance that the government was
committed to monetary restraint, Banxico hiked the reference rate by 50 basis points after an
unannounced meeting, surprising markets and curbing speculation on the peso’s value. The
value of the peso was up just under 3 percent after the announcement.154
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The second instance of an intervention in foreign exchange markets, however, came
shortly after on 21 February 2017, with the announcement of the oﬀering of as much as USD
20 billion in currency hedges. Banxico asserted that FX reserves would not be used—instead,
the policy relies on the auctioning of contracts of non-deliverables.155 The mechanism is
relatively simple: the government oﬀers to pay a price above the spot market rate on the day
of the exchange for a notional amount (which is never in fact paid, hence the term “nondeliverable”) and then auctions the contract. Interested buyers will agree to receive less than
the maximum price oﬀered by Banxico, and the payment is made in pesos, thus propping up
demand for and the value of the currency.
In addition to successive hikes to the reference rate, the central bank has been
refocusing its strategy on such non-monetary policy to curb both inflationary expansion and
avoid sharp plunges in the value of the currency. In October, contracts worth USD 4 billion
were added to the currency hedge oﬀerings.156 Finally, in December of 2017, Banxico
announced an additional USD 500 million would be sold beginning on the last week of the
2017 fiscal year.157 Between the initial announcement in February and the expansions of the
policy in October and again in December, the peso steadily had steadily regained ground
against the dollar, only to start regressing after the beginning of NAFTA’s renegotiation. The
impact, however, has been unequivocally stabilizing: after each announcement, the peso’s fall
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has been reversed and stabilized, and has been on a generalized upward trend since the
beginning of 2017 with the exception of the aforementioned drops.
Moreover, unlike the policies implemented in 2014 and 2015 that depleted reserves,
this type strategy ensures the government’s ability to service debt obligations while controlling
for volatility in the market at the same time. This has proven to be one of the biggest strengths
in maintaining the country’s solid fundamentals. As of April of 2018, foreign reserves held by
the central bank remain at around USD 173 billion, more than enough to confidently service
the country’s external debt, which clocked in at just over USD 200 billion in February.158
Transparency in public documents has played an important part in the confidence that
has been extended to the country’s public administration. In spite of chronic low confidence
in public service and a generally grim panorama, the country’s commitment to fiscal and
monetary responsibility—partially as a result of having a highly-trained army of experts in the
Secretariat of Finance and Banxico—has been at the center of much of the discussion
surrounding the future of the U.S.-Mexico trade relation. On a broader level, credit ratings as
well as international organizations have highlighted the relative strength with which the
country has weathered the highly uncertain environment which surrounds virtually every
aspect of the Mexican economy.
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Foreign policy cases
As this paper turns to consider policy beyond the scope of Mexico’s complex economic
dynamics, foreign cases are evaluated in line with the understanding of diﬀusion theory as a
series of choices to maximize capital attraction. For each case, this means that policy impact
will be assessed based on any changes in the country’s position relative to countries with which
it competes for capital attraction and business formation.
With this in mind, it is important to review Mexico’s economic context to find
comparable cases. Unlike most developing countries, Mexico is closely linked to the political
and economic developments of countries far beyond its economic situation—it has been for a
long time. It was the first developing country to gain admission to the OECD, back in 1994,
and has only expanded its role as regional power since then—the G8 acknowledged its role as
a global leader at the establishment of the Heiligendamm Process in 2007159 and has become
a household name in global climate change negotiations, serving as a bridge between the
Global North and South on several key international policy areas.160 Today, a billion dollars’
worth of goods cross the country’s border with the United States on a daily basis, and the
country has signed FTAs with 46 countries, making it one of the countries with the highest
access to international trade.161
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Even so, Mexico remains a middle-income country, and the odds of that changing are
less than optimistic. Since the implementation of the Progresa, Oportunidades, and Prospera
antipoverty programs—in 1994, 2000, and 2015 respectively—the federal government has
spent just shy of MXN 825 billion on their running.162 During the same period of time, the
national poverty rate, as shown in the table above, the poverty rate has increased slightly, falling
near the end of the Fox administration, in 2006, only to rebound over the past two
administrations.
Using these nuances as search parameters, then, few countries are comparable in terms
of economic context. However, an assessment of the policies implemented by these countries
targeted at the same issues that face Mexico in 2018 should deliver more valuable insights into
the characteristics of policies which may be successful in addressing the underlying obstacles
to growth. To that end, the paper evaluates policies implemented in South Korea (oﬃcially,
the Republic of Korea) and an array of policies implemented in Central and Eastern European
(CEE) transition economies (largely, the former republics and satellite states of the Soviet
Union). For the case of the former, the analysis focuses particularly on the relationship between
the state and the country’s industrial development, and its policies directed at allocating
investment capital. In the case of the CEE states, the focus will be on actions implemented to
attract foreign investment as well as the lessons learned from the countries’ experiences with
attempting to expand access to capital.
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The ROK’s ROI
The case of South Korea (oﬃcially, the Republic of Korea) is a particularly interesting
one, if nothing else, for the immense amount of parallels with Mexico’s own history. As with
Mexico, potential was never lacking in Korea. Since the country’s partition after the end of the
Second World War, the southern half of the peninsula has had its eyes set on greatness. With
the arrival of General Park Chung-hee, those aspirations quickly began to materialize.
Unlike the “perfect dictatorship” that Mexico lived under the PRI’s 71-year hold on
power, however, Park’s ambition had tangible results on the health of the Korean economy
across the board. A violent coup d’état led Park to power in 1961; between the following year
and 1985, nearing the end of military rule in Korea, per capita GNI rose from USD 101.60
to USD 2,032.00, (an average of 13.9 percent annual growth) while overall GNI growing at
an average pace of 8.3 per annum.163 These figures far outperform Mexico’s moderate 5.9
percent annual growth over the same period of time, 2.9 percent of which accounts for
population growth rather than increases in productivity.164
However, the political contexts of the two countries were very similar. Park’s
dictatorship ended with his assassination in 1979, and his successor, Chun Doo-hwan served
as elected President of Korea between 1980 and 1988 after having arrived in power through a
coup of his own. However, the elections of 1988 led Roh Tae-woo, a technocrat with
democratic ambitions for Korea, to the presidency, ushering in the beginning of Korea’s
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democratic transition.165 These events closely track the timeline of the PRI’s loss of its hold on
power over the course of the 1980s. With the arrival of Ernesto Zedillo to Los Pinos in 1994,
Mexico’s own democratic transition began bearing fruit around the same time as Korea’s did.
On the economic front, the countries share even more remarkable similarities. Like a
flawless encore to Mexico’s 1994 performance, Korea took one of its heaviest hits during the
1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis. And the two crises revealed the same structural problems in
each country’s respective financial systems: a woeful lack of regulation, overleveraged banks (as
well as private enterprise), and lending and corporate activities plagued with nepotism and
favoritism. The result, for both countries, was a realization that the financial environment
needed to be strengthened for continued growth and participation in global markets. As a
result, the early 2000s saw complete transformations in the two countries’ regulatory and legal
frameworks.
However, the continued credit expansion and business promotion that Korea
experienced as a result of a stronger financial system was not replicated in Mexico. On the
contrary, an already small credit market became even more restrictive to the general public and
the acquisitions of Mexico’s largest banks by foreign financial conglomerates served to
reinforce the idea that liberalization was tantamount to expatriation of the country’s capital.
In spite of the similarities between the two, the country’s diverging trajectories had been laid
out nearly thirty years prior with the establishment of the chaebol during Park’s regime. The
foundation of economic growth in Korea was widespread and oﬃcialized crony capitalism.
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Chaebol (literally, a wealth clique) are a uniquely Korean phenomenon: they are the
inordinate concentration of Korean capital in the hands of a few wealthy families which control
massive conglomerates in highly productive industries, ranging from automobiles (Hyundai
Group), to high-tech products (Samsung and LG), to petrochemical and energy production
(SK Group). Their ascent was associated with political connections with the ruling elite during
the Park dictatorship. As a result, chaebol received benefits, as a part of a concerted national
strategy, that would enable them to be the economic engine of the country. These included a
preferential trade regime, subsidies funded with public monies, tax breaks, below-market-rate
loans, and in many instances the legal institution of a monopoly in a particular sector.166
If the success of the chaebol model instituted by the Park regime is unquestioned, there
is considerable nuance to how and why these companies were successful. As mentioned before,
the most important piece of the strategy was the monopoly on information held by the Korean
government and their ability to distribute public resources as would best take advantage of the
capital. Moreover, the reason Korea was able to transform the entire economy and virtually
every industry in the span of 25 years was the it did was the complete control that the
government still exercised on finance and the distribution of private ownership. Last, but not
least, Park’s most notable policy to bring about the desired change in Korea was the deliberate
depression of wages until the industries were productive enough to raise wages in a competitive
fashion.167
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The key finding in the Korean case, however, is the eventual transfer of the directive
powers held by the authoritarian regimes of the 1970s and 1980s into the hands of private
capital. As external pressures increased and private ownership of the largest proportion of the
Korean economy developed networks and business beyond the Korean shores, firms were less
keen on centrally-planned economic policy.168 As a result, these firms were instrumental in
redirecting the path that Korea undertook. While to a degree it was these unrestrained market
forces that led to the damage that the Asian Financial Crisis brought upon Korea, it was the
same priorities of the market and the upward pressures on wages which contributed to a rapid
recovery in the economy.
While Mexico has already made the transition into democracy, the resonance of this is
unmissable for Mexican readers. One of the most important outcomes of liberalization was the
acceleration of the PRI’s decline and eventual loss of power. In any situation where actors
external to the central decision-making bodies begin to accumulate capital (both financial as
well as political), they pose a threat for the unilateral direction of developmentalism. It should
therefore be the priority of future administrations to protect social wellbeing and incentivize
responsible business practices. At the same time, they should remain conscious that, in a
democratic society with a liberal economy, public policy can only set a frame or a lane, if you
will, within which economic developments will unfold, but always driven and subject to free
market forces.
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Beating the West at its own game
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the former soviet republics and the Union’s satellite
states have undergone a political and economic transformation at a speed that has drawn the
attention of academics and policymakers worldwide. The Eastern European countries, since
1998, have been in a race against time to implement reforms, including pension privatization
and ultra-low corporate tax structures, that place them far ahead of their Western counterparts
on the liberalization spectrum.
While the European Union has long used accession as a carrot for countries in the
periphery to adhere to social and economic policy more in line with Western ideology, EU
conditionality does not explain the pace of reforms in the CEE states on the economic front.
In fact, in several instances, the reforms adopted went beyond the social policy norms that
many in Brussels sought to see expanded to the eastern end of the continent.169 Support for
the policies came from the World Bank, the OECD, and USAID, using the Chilean experience
in similar reforms nearly two decades prior as an example to follow.170
The degree to which such policies were implemented, however, proved to be the
determining factor in the country’s recovery following the Russia Crisis of 1998. As is the case
with Mexico, CEE countries required investment in infrastructure, which was underdeveloped
in nearly all states. The countries that saw the greatest FDI flows following the beginning of
the recovery were states which had since the earlier half of the decade undertaken drastic
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measures to privatize industry and the financial sector. However, the policies that truly made
a diﬀerence were those that fundamentally reformed the framework for business operations in
the countries. Countries which committed to such reforms were rewarded with rapid growth
driven by FDI allocation according to market forces and exports to the EU.171 Especially active
in implementing these reforms were the Baltic States, which adapted rather quickly and grew
rapidly even after the GFC.
The question for the case of CEE states is what compelled them to implement such
actions. According to economists, two main reasons stand out. First, the intense competition
that countries in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Baltic sea found themselves in following
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Given the sudden emergence of more than ten new countries,
all with similar conditions for investment, countries strove to diﬀerentiate themselves from the
competition. From a perspective of diﬀusion theory as described by Tiebout, this conclusion
is in line with rational policy actors in the region. This explains why a country might go well
below the recommended corporate tax rate. Low cost of business incentivizes the establishment
of global firms in the countries, which in turn provide a near permanent source of foreign
financing and labor opportunities. 172 Indeed, since the implementation of these tax structures
in CEE countries, literature surrounding the corporate tax rate has addressed its impact on the
availability of similar capital in neighboring countries, suggesting that a country’s decision to
lower taxes incentivizes reductions to the homologous rate nearby. While the topic remains a
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hotly contested one, a line of thought in European economics suggests that the Union should
spend less time criticizing CEE states for the incentives to capital attraction. Rather, this
current suggests, EU corporate tax policy should fall in line with CEE schemes to equalize
capital dispersion throughout the continent.173
The second reason is an amalgamation of political, fiscal, and social factors. Following
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the public in most CEE states had a generally negative
perception of most policy associated with the communist experiment. Publicly-funded pension
plans were among these. At the same time, a wrecked political environment dominated by
weak competing parties and little commitment to public policy meant that leaders in most
countries’ governments were looking to reduce the responsibilities of the state and devolve,
where possible, the provision of social goods to the private sector. Last, from a fiscal
perspective, cash-strapped governments in the region, aware of the political and social benefits
to removing pensions from state control, acted additionally to reduce the burden of supporting
the retired—and therefore underproductive—on the public budget.174
By measuring GDP per capita levels in the CEE economies, the diﬀerence between
countries that implemented aggressive liberalizing strategies—that is, Poland, Czechia, and the
Baltic States—and those which did not—primarily in the Balkans and the former Soviet
Republics—is evident. 175 The results of the policies are clear—the “shock therapy” of the 1990s
was conducive in a speedier restoration of income levels to what they were prior to the collapse
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of the Soviet Union, and countries that implemented such reforms on average performed better
than countries with gradual liberalization strategies.176
In spite of the marked diﬀerence in short-term performance, however, it is important
to note that the ability of a country to remain on this track is highly dependent on whether or
not policies are accompanied by institutionalization and regulation for the proper functioning
of a market economy.177 This distinction is crucial in any eﬀort to adapt the reformist spirit
embraced by the countries in this case. As it applies to Mexico, any policies or generalized
strategies proposed which involve aggressive reform or liberalization in any sense—for
instance, the auctioning of exploration and extraction contracts for a newly opened petroleum
industry—have to first consider whether or not the necessary institutions exist to ensure
optimal market performance.
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VI. Policy recommendations
The research conducted and laid out in the previous chapters aims to present Mexico’s
reality, contextualize the particularities of the country’s economic position through a historical
analysis, and evaluate potential future strategies by reviewing domestic and foreign policies
that highlight the strengths and weaknesses of each. Keeping in mind the country’s economic
history as outlined in Chapter I, given the challenges identified in Chapter II, and based on
the policy assessment conducted in Chapter III, this thesis presents several policy
recommendations that fall into two broader policy goals that the government should keep in
mind as the country moves beyond 2018: (1) achieving generalized productivity growth which
will be the backbone of economic gains as the country’s demographic panorama shifts, and (2)
moderating the country’s excessive dependence on the United States to reduce volatility
associated with U.S. domestic policy developments.

Generalizing productivity growth
The first of these is the country’s low productivity problem. Since 1994, at-large
productivity has grown by 4.5 percent—an average 0.2 percent annual rate that has quashed
the country’s ambitions of taking advantage of the untapped human and capital resources
identified by myriad international observers.178 As indicated by the country’s population
growth estimates, the country’s demographic expansion will not be enough to continue to
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sustain economic growth. Without sizeable improvements to productivity, growth will not be
able to remain above 2 percent in the medium run.179
Naturally, given the magnitude of the problem, the following policies are not meant
to be suﬃcient in overcoming the challenges posed by productivity stagnation. However, the
following three policies should serve as a basis upon which future administrations can build to
address any changes in the country’s outlook without losing sight of the main drivers of
economic stability and growth.

Progressive increments to the minimum wage
In addressing the low productivity that has hindered the country’s growth, the obvious
first step is dealing with stagnant wages, more specifically, the minimum wage. While exports
have grown substantially since NAFTA’s implementation, the country’s labor output,
measured in the wages of workers in every industry, has been shrinking as a proportion of
GDP. In 2016, labor represented roughly 36.6 percent of Mexico’s product (compared to
ratios closer to 60 percent of GDP for the rest of the G20 countries)180. This suggests that the
country is highly dependent on its exports and thus more vulnerable than comparable
countries in an economic recession. It seems evident that wages need to grow faster than GDP
for this to be amended.
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While the minimum wage is not universally applied—informal employment
agreements are not subject to the federal disposition—the figure serves as a benchmark to
which formal businesses can compare their compensation and pay raises. Consequently, the
decision to maintain wages so far below the minimum living wage has had repercussions.
Among Mexico’s economically active population, a large proportion of those who earn above
the minimum wage have their salaries tied to the daily minimum—it is not uncommon to find
labor contracts, as well as payment of any number of federal and state obligations, defined in
terms of minimum wages rather than in monetary terms for the purpose of standardization.181
Changes to the minimum wage, then, or maintaining the current level, would not only aﬀect
the base wage earners. Therefore, an adjustment to the federal minimum wage is in order. And
the magnitude of the adjustment is of particular interest.
Mexico’s current daily minimum wage, in eﬀect since 1 December of 2017, sits at
MXN 88.36. At nominal exchange rates, that translates to USD 4.84. The minimum wage
level cannot be compared to the corresponding figure in the U.S.—cost of living is vastly
diﬀerent between the two countries. However, even when compared to its peers in the rest of
Latin America, Mexico comes in last.182 On the lower end of the spectrum, Colombia’s
monthly minimum clocks in at USD 278.73 (COP 781,242.00); slightly ahead is Brazil with
a minimum USD 287.94 (BRL 954.00) since the beginning of 2018. Closer to the higher
end, minimum wage earners in Chile are legally entitled to USD 455.93 (CLP 276,000.00).
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In Argentina, with the highest minimum wage in the region, they can claim USD 470.88
(ARS 9,500.00)—and the Argentine Congress has already approved a hike to ARS 10,000 in
July of 2018. In Mexico, when translated to monthly terms, the minimum wage for a 48-hour
workweek is a meager USD 116.23 (MXN 2,120.64).
Previous literature, however, suggests that rapid increases to the minimum wage will
have a damaging eﬀect on the achievements in labor formalization and employment.183 That
being said, most literature on the eﬀects of minimum wage hikes was based on data from
advanced economies. An in-depth empirical study by Campos Vázquez, Esquivel, and
Santillán Hernández on the impact of the homogenization of minimum salaries in 2012 paints
a more nuanced picture of the eﬀects of such an adjustment to the Mexican context.
In advanced economies, wage elasticity is significantly negative: in general, hikes to the
minimum wage are followed by a reduction in unskilled labor. Even in situations where there
is no evidence of an immediate decrease in the rate of labor occupation, demand for labor falls
over time, which negatively impacts the economy.184 The counterargument is that minimum
wage increases—even progressively—tend to succeed in boosting growth by increasing
consumption. Additionally, other research has found that the diﬀerences in labor demand is
less closely correlated to wages as was previously thought.
If the idea of rapid economic growth coming as a result of hikes to the minimum wage
has been disproved by several studies, the reality remains that the minimum wage is indeed a
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necessary protection for workers in sectors with a highly elastic labor demand and fierce
competition because of excessive supply. The principle behind the institution of a minimum
wage, from a social policy perspective, is that no person should, while working a full-time job
(as defined by the respective jurisdiction), find themselves unable to aﬀord the basic cost of
living for them and their family.185 The reality of the situation, however, suggests that the
policy is not fulfilling its goal. Even with the December 2017 increase, the minimum wage is
not suﬃcient to aﬀord the basic consumer goods basket as defined by INEGI’s national
consumer price index.186 According to Coneval (National Council for Social Development
Policy Evaluation), the threshold of wellbeing sits still seven pesos higher, at MXN 95.24; the
country’s preëminent employers’ association, Coparmex, has lobbied to have the minimum
wage pegged to Coneval’s threshold wage.187
Following the review of the aforementioned study, it seems plausible to induce further
increases to the minimum wage to ensure it fulfills its objective of providing sustenance to a
family. As shown in the study, the 5.4 percent increase in real wages as a result of the
homogenization of the minimum wage across regions produced no significant negative eﬀects
on either hourly wages nor on employment. On the contrary, labor income grew for those
directly impacted by the hike, and employment, if anything, became more stable,
strengthening the desire to remain in the formal sector. More importantly, the homogenization
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of standards actually changed the incentive structure for self-employed Mexicans and workers
in the informal economy to transition to formal employment. 188
To address the problems associated with the low minimum wage, this thesis proposes
the implementation of a progressive policy to raise the minimum wage to competitive levels
over the course of six years. The proposal suggests quarterly increases of 4.25 percent to the
minimum wage, pushing the daily minimum to MXN 240.00 after twenty-four quarters.
Taking the evidence from the homogenization of wages as a basis for comparison, such
moderate increases should succeed in raising the living standards for minimum wage earners,
increasing the incentives to transition to or remain in the formal sector, while avoiding eﬀects
on employment by spreading out the rise in cost of labor over the course of six years.
More broadly, this proposal achieves three objectives:
1. Fulfilment of the purpose of the minimum wage in accordance with federal labor law.
According to Coneval, the baseline wage to keep a person from extreme poverty today
sits just above MXN 95 a day. However, that figure represents the wage required for one
person’s basic necessities. In six states, a majority of households earn no more than two daily
minimum wages189, which today translates to just over USD 5,450 when adjusted for the cost
of living. it is imperative that the wage aﬀord a suﬃcient standard of living for those families.
With the implementation of this thesis’ proposal—and assuming stability in the growth of
purchasing power adjustment—at the end of six years a household earning two daily
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minimums would see their annual income, adjusted for purchasing power, rise to roughly
USD 13,600.190
2. Real wage growth for the lowest earners above general inflation.
Agustin Carstens, the former Governor of Banxico, has cautioned against drastic
increases to the minimum wage as proposed by labor groups, warning that such changes would
put excessive upward pressure on inflation, which if left unchecked could eat up any wage
increases at all earning levels. However, Carstens’s Banxico is notable for having kept inflation
expectations well anchored at 3 percent, and over the course of the last administration, core
inflation has remained in line with expectations. The proposed increase supposes an 18.11
percent annual rise in the nominal minimum wage—when adjusted for headline inflation
forecast for 2018, the real increase in the minimum wage falls to 13.07 percent per annum.191
This would aid in countering the generalized drop in real wages seen since 2006, which has
aﬀected labor product and GDP at large. Additionally, increases at that scale for the lowest
earners in the formal sector would incentivize formalization, raising the productivity levels of
the economy as a whole by reducing the large fall in productivity seen in traditional (read:
informal) enterprises since 1990.192
3. Improved access to financial products, capital, and increases to domestic savings.
With relation to the other goals of the policy strategies outlined here, a higher level of
earnings and the expansion of the formal sector of the economy would suggest that a greater
share of the population would be able to access financial products. Paired with a loosening of
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the financial sector’s credit requirements, the increase in the minimum wage could translate
into expanded access to capital. If implemented responsibly—which can be achieved through
financial literacy programs—this could incentivize households to use credit to increase
household investment and allow for the expansion of domestic savings.

Reallocation of FDI and public social spending
As mentioned before, Mexico has long been a darling of international investors looking
for healthy returns in a relatively safe emerging market. Over the last two decades, foreign
direct investment in Mexico, however, has seen a transformation in terms of the object of
capital received from external sources. Prior to NAFTA, and even in the early years after its
implementation, FDI by and large was used for the development of a manufacturing industry
that would allow the sending countries to outsource parts of their own production processes
to lower costs, creating wider profit margins and economic growth for the sending country.
Today FDI flows have increased substantially—FDI received in 1999 from all countries was
about equal to that originating only in the U.S. in 2017—and is aimed at production and
development for foreign business looking for lower costs for high-skilled labor and lower
barriers to trade, as well as for domestic businesses which take advantage of foreign funding
for projects ranging from digital design, to agricultural innovations, to investments in
infrastructure.
However, a surface evaluation of Mexico’s economic situation suggests that twenty
years and half a billion dollars later, FDI seems to have been particularly unsuccessful at
jumpstarting growth. A closer look into the object of FDI and the results achieved by
89

individual sectors reveals a more nuanced picture of the impact of foreign capital on growth.
Firms in dynamic and competitive industries such as manufacturing (e.g., Bombardier,
General Motors, Nissan, Audi), finance and insurance (e.g., BBVA’s Bancomer, CitiBanamex,
Santander, AXA Group), and telecommunications (AT&T) have continuously represented
over two-thirds of the FDI captured by Mexico. In other sectors, however, foreign capital is
lacking. Rodrigo Aguilera argues that the cause is clear: lack of competition in several industries
and uncompetitive wages that inhibit domestic spending.193
One of the most successful examples of reforms working to increase competitiveness,
lower consumer prices, and improve the general quality of the service has been the
telecommunications industry since the passing of the 2013 reform on the matter. The
communications sector component of the national consumer price index recorded a 28.5
percent fall in prices for the industry since reform. At the same time, the government’s
intervention to compel the domestic duopoly (Mexican giant América Móvil and Spain’s
Telefónica controlled 92 percent of the mobile market as of 2010194) was not met by a
retraction in infrastructure and service expansion investment by the two—the two firms
followed the dispositions set forth by the IFT in allowing AT&T to use the existing
infrastructure while it developed its own. As of 2017, AT&T commands a 15.09 percent
market share195 but has already surpassed Telefónica as the second most profitable of mobile
operators.196 This growth highlights the necessity for reform in less productive industries.
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The recent reforms in the energy and financial sectors should bring positive outcomes
to the share of FDI in those sectors as well. However, the key question going forward, with
respect to FDI, is how to ensure that the benefits of foreign capital in any given industry or
firm can be spread to the rest of the economy. Importantly, the framework for foreign
investment has to be addressed to ensure that, while high-capturing industries such as
manufacturing and technology continue to be the object of foreign capital injection, less
attractive industries—but industries with a high potential for growth nonetheless—are also
targeted. Through the review of successful policies implemented in Mexico it became clear that
the most successful in achieving their stated goals were those which addressed deficiencies in
public strategy, spending, and the framework that aﬀects the business environment in the
country. So, the government’s objective should not be to compel foreign capital providers to
provide FDI on an equal basis to all industries and all regions by force. Nor should it take a
strategy whereby FDI grows but it remains concentrated in one industry.
Changes to the legal framework, reduction in bureaucratic processes and the
elimination of non-tariﬀ barriers to trade, and the strengthening of IP protections have
facilitated investing in the country. Consequently, the goal of future policy is to further
incentivize FDI in Mexico to attract higher amounts of capital, and to ensure that said
investment spills over into the rest of the economy. To that end, the recommendation that I
put forth in this thesis is a strategy of structural incentives for investment in industries with a
large potential for development, where large amounts of capital may mean the diﬀerence
between productivity and the lack thereof.

91

Reorganization of the legal framework surrounding land use in the primary sector
Land reform in the early XX Century placed large swaths of land, known as ejidos,
under communal control to redistribute the country’s property and allow for individual wealth
creation. A century later, however, the sector is stagnant and communal lands are among the
least capital productive subsectors, owing largely to a lack of infrastructure, low technological
incursion, and poor resources. So much so that 41.2 percent of youth from ejidos across the
country leave the community in search of better economic opportunity, some to the U.S.,
some to urban centers, but some others even to other rural areas to work in private agricultural
industry.197
Considering that 102 million hectares, 53.4 percent of the Mexican territory, are held
in social possessions, ensuring they become productive is paramount for the soundness of the
primary sector. To that end, the government should undertake a substantial reform to facilitate
the transfer of land to private buyers, domestic or foreign. The entry of FDI into the industry
will be critical in bringing about the technological improvements necessary to make the sector
more productive.
Agroindustry is capital-intensive by nature,198 irrespective of technology acquisition.
However, by injecting into the industry the capacity to adapt new technologies, eﬃciency will
be optimized and the yield from available capital will be higher, transforming the industry to
the benefit of workers in the sector and its contribution to GDP.
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Coöperation among state and federal governments to attract capital
As in the United States, Mexico’s government is organized as a federalist state whereby
responsibility is shared among the federal government in Mexico City, the mayor and city
council of the former, and the 31 state governments across the country. Since the advent of
democratization, there has been a subtler trend in domestic politics towards the increased
importance of local leaders in formulating policy for each state.199
State governments should take advantage of the reduced preponderance of the federal
executive to be more active in pursuing policies for the benefit of the state. At the same time,
leaders at both levels of government should strive toward increased coöperation, especially as
it relates to economic policy. As the representative for all 31 states and Mexico City, the federal
government is constrained in acting with aggressive policy in any given region by the
considerations of the impact that may have elsewhere. Moreover, policy coming out of Mexico
City has to promote national inclusion. The state governments, on the other hand, have more
leeway in pursuing more focalized projects, and should indeed pursue them. Take, for instance,
the suspension of a government contract awarded to a Sino-Mexican consortium to build a
high-speed train connecting Mexico City and Querétaro. If the reasoning of the suspension
suggests improvements on the matter of corruption, the cancellation of the contract leaves the
government with an obligation for reparations to China Railway Construction Corporation
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(CRCC) and the rest of the consortium.200 If the federal government found itself unable to
continue with the project bid as awarded, there is no reason why the governments of the
interested states should have been unable to coördinate to go through with the project.
The proposition here is that states take the initiative to promote policies to attract
foreign investment, either through public procurement for infrastructure projects, public
spending to position the state as a competitive destination for market expansion, and the
coöperation with other state governments. For the federal government, this would mean
furthering the principles of the tax reform for participatory budgeting, whereby monies in the
public treasury are less concentrated at the federal level—after all, local governments, both
state and municipal, are better aware of the needs of their jurisdictions and better equipped to
address the problems if given the resources.201
This will prove important because, as state governments become more capable of
managing these relations and defining policy direction locally, the federal government will
have to—and will be more eﬀective in—concentrating national policy towards an equal
distribution of investment and a sustained and balanced level of growth. This means that even
in 2018, National Palace can and should prioritize improvements to the standard of living of
indigenous communities in Oaxaca, a state marred by low investment, low quality of life
indicators, and violence, over investments in infrastructural updates in Nuevo León, a state
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that already has income and standard of living indicators comparable to those of
Mediterranean Europe.

Reorientation of public spending priorities toward infrastructure and social
investment
Along similar lines, a pressing question for Mexico today is how to increase
productivity while taking advantage of the leaps achieved in tertiary education and the high
levels of professionalization in the Mexican labor market to increase wages across the board.
As outlined above, the redirection of private investment towards productive industries across
the country has to take into account the competitive advantages associated with the
resources—natural, human, and capital—that define each geographic region. An important
diﬀerentiating factor among the country’s states and regions is the quality of human capital
available, and thus, the kind of FDI it receives. In recent years, economic activity at the
national level has been slow, but the trend is not uniform. In 2016, with annual growth rates
above 5 percent, the states of Aguascalientes (9.5), Quintana Roo (7.6), Colima (5.7), Sonora
(5.6), Sinaloa (5.5), and Chihuahua (5.1) demonstrated the dynamism associated with the
country’s economic panorama. With the exception of Quintana Roo, where the dominant
economic activity is tourism, all states are highly industry-dominated, have high rates of
educational attainment, and a high degree of connectivity with the rest of the world.202 This
has to do, to a large degree, with the focus these states have placed on higher education.
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The federal government should make a concerted eﬀort to shift public expenditure
priorities to focus on social areas that have been demonstrated to correlate with the attraction
of capital and economic performance. This includes greater spending on publicly-funded
scholarships for lower-income families, improvements to public education systems (see below
the example of the University of Guadalajara), and credits to low earning families to enable
spending on household wellbeing, increase domestic spending, and grant access to better
healthcare services without a detriment to educational or career development.

Credit expansion
The business of gathering and distributing credit information is a lucrative one, albeit
one that depends heavily on the availability of information to gather and distribute. With the
modification in the framework regulating the gathering and sharing of credit and financial
information in 1996 as a part of the stabilization strategy, three private SICs were established.
However, by 1998, two of the three had ceased operations. As of March of 2018, there are
again three SICs registered with the securities commission, but only two operate
independently, one of which has operated continuously since 1996.203 While three is a typical
number of SICs for any country, the information they provide is limited—Buró de Crédito
serves as the in-country technical partner for both Dun & Bradstreet204 and Transunion de
México205, meaning they possess the same information that businesses provide to Buró de
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Crédito. But unless there is a marked expansion of the availability of credit in the country, the
finance industry will not need more information than the three of these firms can provide.206
One of the biggest challenges for the continued expansion of both the role and the
breadth of information maintained by credit bureaus is the size of Mexico’s credit market.
Unlike other emerging markets, available credit is severely limited in Mexico. According to the
national financial inclusion survey in 2015, only 44 percent of adults in the country owned a
bank account207—by comparison, 63 percent of Chilean adults, 68 percent of Brazilian adults,
70 percent of South African adults, and 78 percent of Thai adults had accounts in formal
financial institutions. 208 Moreover, as a percentage of the country’s economy, Mexico again
lags behind the rest of the region: as of July of 2016, Mexico’s domestic private credit
represented 35 percent of GDP, abysmal when compared to Brazil’s (62 percent of GDP) or
Chile’s (112 percent of GDP).209 As outlined by the World Bank’s Financial Capability in
Mexico report of 2013, there is a significant relationship between the type of employment a
person has and their knowledge of—and therefore, access to—financial products. People who
are employed in the informal sector, who also end to have lower levels of educational
attainment, are more prone to financial strain, which is then addressed through informal
borrowing.210 This is related both to deficiencies in education about formal financial products
and to the risk associated with the precarious nature of informal employment.
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If Mexico is known to a large degree for its important agricultural tradition,
productivity in the sector has long been lackluster. The sector’s share of the country’s GDP has
fallen from 3.6 percent in 1993 to 3.1 percent in 2016. In theory, NAFTA’s implementation
should have allowed the sector to boom. While it is indeed true that Mexican agricultural
products easily found demand in the U.S. and Canada following the treaty’s ratification, the
sector’s relevance in national production has fallen primarily as a result of is productivity
problems. As evidenced by the CEE case, agriculture is by nature a capital-intensive industry,
requiring a greater share of capital than it contributes to GDP. In the case of Mexico, these
disparities are exacerbated by the low degree of technological incursion in the industry and the
legal framework that surrounds large swaths of land in several of the country’s most fertile
regions. As a proportion of internal debt in the private sector, the agricultural industry
accounted for credit totaling MXN 70 billion in 2016.211 The same year, net private sector
debt clocked in at MXN 8.16 trillion—the entirety of credit extended to the industry
represented 0.8 percent of private sector credit.212 By way of comparison, during the same year,
just shy of 7 million Mexicans were employed in the primary sector, a full 13.28 percent of
the country’s economically active population.213 It is worth noting that only 2.5 percent of
these loans were past due, suggesting that, if the availability of credit is near non-existent for
the sector, financial institutions have been assiduous in evaluating potential borrowers’ risk.
This being the case, the low degree of nonperforming loans lends itself as evidence that
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regulations to develop a sound financial system have been successful. In addition, smaller firms,
especially those with a traditional product or service oﬀering, tend to find themselves without
the capital to increase productivity because of barriers to financial products.214 Removing these
barriers will be crucial in ensuring that they are better able to compete with well-financed
competition.
However, easing restrictions on access to credit is a double-edged sword. While broader
access to financial products is essential in increasing household savings and the accumulation
of wealth, a laxer financial regulatory environment incentivizes perverse behavior. The degree
of related lending during the crisis of 1994 served as evidence of this from a supplier
perspective. However, the same is true for demand-side behavior.
The Great Financial Crisis of 2008 was detonated, in part, by a mortgage default crisis,
the result of an accelerated expansion of the credit market for homeowners in the U.S. Given
the access to technologies which permit near-constant developments, innovations in the
finance sector which would allow for higher returns on investment in largely unregulated
instruments can be the apple to tempt unsophisticated or negligent investors. The result of
such practices without controls are clear—the securitization of subprime mortgages played an
important role in the collapse of the banking system, as financial institutions that invested
heavily in mortgage-backed securities took heavy losses and found themselves insolvent.
As outlined in the previous chapter, Mexico’s financial sector is still relatively young,
and the degree of stability it has achieved is largely a result of the strengthening of regulations
and the legal framework surrounding the industry. The objective of policies to expand credit
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access should not undermine this environment. For the secondary and tertiary sectors of
Mexico’s economy, the primary challenge as it relates to credit is ensuring that capital provided
to industries increases productivity. This cannot be achieved through public policy, as each
firm will have to determine a strategy to optimize productivity through an evaluation of its
own position, internal strengths and weaknesses, and external opportunities and threats.
Instead, policy at the federal level should target the expansion of credit to the primary sector
of the economy, to small- and medium-sized enterprises (pequeñas y medianas empresas or
pymes) with high growth potential, and to individuals working independently seeking to enter
the formalized economy. To that end, policy to ease access to credit should have a dual focus
as outlined below:
On one front, the continued strengthening of the financial sector through legal
protections for creditors, periodic evaluation of financial mismanagement and perverse
business practices, and granting further independence to the CNBV and other regulatory
organisms. All of these things working in tandem will provide the industry further resilience
and establish the Mexican financial sector as a stable, attractive, and advantageous option for
foreign financial institutions looking to enter the credit market.215 Mexico’s financial sector is
already highly competitive,216 however, and interest rates in the private sector are largely
determined by the benchmark rates set by Banxico. As in other complex financial markets, the
result of intense competition is often the development of new investment and credit products
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for potential customers outside the sector’s traditional client base. In the case of Mexico, there
is already a growing number of microlenders beyond the formal financial institutions that
extend credits to small, informal businesses and individuals in tight financial circumstances.
Easing regulation to allow these firms to enter the formal credit market would expand
opportunities for these customers to then access more complex financial products. At the same
time, it expands the size of the industry and, by bringing these microlenders into a wellregulated framework, avoids the economic losses associated with their being outside the formal
economy.
The second front, and the more crucial one, is the expansion of those opportunities to
the public. While access to credit can be improved through deregulation in the sector, the idea
of changing the direction of policy in the financial sector seems unwise. As is, the continuous
progression of formal protections in the sector is what has given foreign investment the
confidence to enter the market. Two eﬀorts by the public, however, can increase the degree to
which capital is available to a broader proportion of society.
First, eﬀorts to improve financial literacy may prove crucial in inducing trust from the
public in the banks—much of which was lost following the debacle of 1994. This is especially
important when paired with the recommendation to increase education. Mexico’s challenges
are in a large part founded on insuﬃcient knowledge or education.
Second, financial infrastructure has to be expanded. Alexander Herman and Alexander
Klemm, in an IMF Working Paper on financial deepening in the country, pinpoint the
country’s credit problem on the supply side. Notably, however, credit shortage is not a result
of a problem in turning deposits into credit, but rather a low level of deposits as well. Their
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empirical studies suggest that banking infrastructure and a low degree of physical access to
financial products are behind the shallow financial depth in the country.217 Addressing both of
these dimensions should produce the necessary expansion of credit through organic means.
This ensures that the industry remains solid and performs well, avoiding perverse financial
practices regardless of the size of the credit portfolio in the country.

Lowering barriers to formalization
In the case of the Asian Tigers in general, and looking particularly at the Korean case,
the main driver of growth since the end of state-led economic planning has been the increase
in wages in high-tech industries. This was driven by the preponderance of the export industries
in the Korean economy and the fact that wages were largely determined by the revenues
produced by these industries. Moreover, in such firms, productivity tends to be high and grow
rapidly. In the case of Mexico, this is especially true—modern firms, irrespective of their size,
productivity per annum has averaged 5.8 percent since 1999. Traditional, informal businesses,
on the other hand, had average productivity decreases of 6.5 percent during the same period of
time.218 The reason behind this drastic diﬀerence has to do with low access to capital in
traditional enterprises described above paired with high capital requirements and low capital
yield. With the high costs associated with formalization, however, the incentive for businesses
and individuals is to remain put. This dichotomy illustrates the need for a new strategy for
business creation and formalization in Mexico.
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Among the most important policy goals identified here, then, is the creation of
incentives for domestic private capital formation in high-growth industries. As an example,
Guadalajara, capital of the western state of Jalisco, stands among the most devoted local
governments in the country. The government of the state too has had a considerable hand in
this transformation as Government Palace, together with the city of Guadalajara, have been
investing aggressively into a project to transform the city into a hub for technological
innovation—in 2013, the two committed MXN 220 million into the project. By 2016, the
state government had committed an additional MXN 150 million, matched by another MXN
300 million by Mexico City. The state’s 2018 budged tagged yet another MXN 150 million
for the project.219 The developments in the city captured international attention and, in 2015,
the Inter-American Development Bank (IABD) announced it would too commit USD
500,000 to the project. The Digital Creative City, as the planned development is called, is
aimed at attracting new and existing firms, both foreign and international, in the creative and
technology industries.220
At the same time, they have invested heavily in the state’s public university system to
make graduates competitive candidates for foreign firms looking to outsource or expand
internationally. The University of Guadalajara is Jalisco’s public, higher education system,
which operates in a manner similar to the University of California system in the U.S. It
includes six campuses spread across the Guadalajara metropolitan area with diﬀerent academic
concentrations and nine regional campuses across the state which make up one of the most
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respected and best performing academic systems in the country. And it has been recognized
for its push to develop a more competitive educational oﬀer in high-tech academic areas
internally, and a more tech-savvy environment in the state through the sponsoring of several
global-scale events.221
As a result of this investment orientation, Guadalajara, heart of the Mexican Silicon
Valley, as Jalisco has come to be known, has now become home to over 300 startups since
2014, receiving hundreds of millions in VC investment. And some 600 well-established firms,
including international giants such as Intel, Oracle, HP, IBM, and Dell, all have oﬃces in the
city and surrounding suburbs.222 Because domestic companies and startups compete with
foreign firms for talent, wages have risen substantially in the sector. Even if an average
employee earns less than they would in the U.S., average wages for high-tech employees in the
city sits at USD 1,916.42 monthly, nearly 6 times the average wage of USD 330 monthly.223
However, this is a very localized case. Moreover, not all jurisdictions have the same
capital and revenue that Jalisco does. And while there should be increased investment in these
sectors, caution should be exercised to avoid curtailing funding for successful programs
targeted at poverty alleviation and public services. Consequently, this kind of public
investment reorientation has to be adjusted, as the state cannot simply choose to spend more
on growth. Moreover, the aim here is to replicate successful cases in local jurisdictions at the
federal level. Even then, the government cannot direct private capital as it sees fit. South Korea
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presents a unique case in that, during the country’s period of high growth, the government
was an authoritarian regime untied to commercial interests. Rather, they were able to manage
the economy very eﬀectively and move public funds as they saw fit. Without advocating for a
democratic regression in a country which has fought so hard for democratization, the best way
to achieve this is to incentivize through deregulation and tax breaks as opposed to further
spending. To that end, two policy points should be pursued to incentivize business formation
and formalization without the need to resort to multi-million-peso budgets.
The federal government is already well underway on the first—the reduction of entry
costs to the formal economy. In 2016, the legislation governing corporations, Ley General de
Sociedades Mercantiles, was amended to simplify the registration of a business before the
Secretariat of the Economy, introducing a new category: sociedad por acciones simplificada
(simplified limited liability company).224 The registration can now be done online, a process
that lasts as little as three hours, and there are no fees associated with the process. Prior to
reform, the average fees associated with formalization were about MXN 30,000, more than
the annual income of a minimum wage earner already in the formal sector.225
The second part of this, and the proposal I recommend, is the institution of a
progressive tax rate for incorporated businesses. Given the drastic diﬀerences in the sizes of
firms, and the reality that 48 percent of the country’s employed population works in firms no
larger than 19 people in size, a reduction in the tax burden on these firms is key in further
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incentivizing preëxisting firms operating in the informal sector to formalize.226 Paired with new
access to capital, a raise in minimum wages, and the low entry costs associated with formal
registration, the ability to broaden profit margins thanks to a lighter tax burden should be an
added incentive to operate in the formal sector. These policies would push individuals to enter
more competitive markets in search of higher returns. This invariably will lead to increases in
productivity, if for nothing more, the higher wages produced and the ability to generate greater
revenue as a formal business.

Crafting a global strategic vision
The second broad policy goal included in the country’s economic strategy should be
weaning Mexico’s economy from U.S. consumer demand. As has been remarked by virtually
everyone, from politicians to the private sector, one of Mexico’s biggest sources of risk is the
country’s excessive dependence on trade with its North American neighbors. Mexico’s exports
make up a third of the country’s economic production—with over four fifths of those exports
going to the U.S. and Canada, a full quarter of the Mexican economy depends directly on the
performance of the former two.227 On the investment side, the U.S. provides 44 percent of the
country’s FDI.228 This kind of overexposure proved catastrophic in 2009, when the financial
crisis in the U.S. led to a contraction of GDP to the tune of 6 percent in Mexico. Therefore,
and in light of Mexico’s current trade predicament with NAFTA’s renegotiation up in the air,
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it is urgent that the government focus its eﬀorts on cushioning the potential blow that negative
developments across the border may have on Mexico.

While the policies outlined in this section are less dependent on unilateral action by
the federal executive, they should nonetheless be taken into serious consideration in
determining the orientation of Mexico’s economic policy as well as general foreign policy going
forward.

A Latin American Union?
Since the advent of independence in the region, Latin America has been disconnected.
In spite of being one of the largest regions globally with broad cultural, economic, and
historical ties, close coöperation has not come easily. A long history of revolution after
revolution, followed by foreign interventions, military dictatorships, civil dictatorships,
commercial protectionism and divergent political ideologies made for a largely balkanized
Latin America for the better part of history.
In recent years, that has changed drastically. The second half of the last century saw
the formation of a large number of regional organizations aimed at fostering cultural,
commercial and political ties among countries in the region. The most notable of these has
long been Mercosur, a free-trade zone, customs union, and free-movement zone that
encompasses 72% of South America—an area three times the size of the European Union.
And the bloc had EU aspirations since its inception. Like the latter, Mercosur adopted a
common framework for customs beyond the member states, all restrictions to the movement
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of goods and people were lifted, and for a time, there was considerable support for the
establishment of a common currency.229 To a large degree, Mercosur was long united by
political ideology—member countries were governed by successive left-of-center governments
until the political shifts that have occurred in the last three years. With right-of-center
governments now in control of Brazil and Argentina, political observers suggest that the unity
of the bloc may be faltering.230 Notably, Shannon K. O’Neil, Senior Fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations suggests that changes in Buenos Aires’ outlook, marked by a recent trade
agreement with Chile, as well as the economic downturn in Brazil may signal an opening for
the two to seek new trading partners beyond the bloc.
Mexico should take advantage of this opportunity to expand its footprint with the
world beyond its southern border. In the near future, a key component of Mexican diplomacy
should be a concerted eﬀort towards Latin American integration. Considering that South
America’s GDP at nominal rates, even excluding Venezuela given the country’s current
situation, is expected to rise to above USD 4 trillion by 2019, Mexico should strive to better
integrate itself into the region. The direction of the next administration will be crucial for this:
with right-of-center administrations in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Colombia—the five
largest economies on the continent—and Paraguay, fostering greater economic inclusion
should be a priority. Moreover, given the cultural and historic ties in the region, there is ample
potential for inclusion beyond a removal of trade barriers.

229

Claire Felter and Danielle Renwick, “Mercosur: South America’s Fractious Trade Bloc,” Backgrounder,
Council on Foreign Relations (26 December 2017).
230
Ernesto Londoño, Shasta Darlington, and Daniel Politi, “‘World Upside Down’: As Trump Pushes Tariffs,
Latin America Links Up,” The New York Times, 18 March 2018.

108

While Mercosur has seen a general decline due to ideological fragmentation,
cooperation with Argentina and Brazil to revive the organization through expansion might yet
bear fruit. In the bloc’s first twenty years of existence, total trade grew from just under USD
200 billion in 1994 to over USD 800 billion by 2014.231 The expansion of the common market
to include Mexico, and foreseeably, the countries of the Pacific Alliance, would bring along
free trade agreements with 52 countries worldwide, making the potential customs union
among the four countries one of the most attractive markets for global trade.

A Caribbean belt and the Pan-American road
Along similar lines, another potential axis for integration is Mexico’s immediate
vicinity: Central America and the Caribbean. Already the Caribbean looks to Mexico for FDI
flows: after Chile, Mexico is the region’s second largest source of FDI from Latin America.232
Expanding that presence would give Mexico an additional platform to expand trade beyond
the Western Hemisphere, by using the Caribbean as a jumping board to the Middle East. At
the same time, assertive foreign policy in the region may be key in asserting Mexico’s position
as a stalwart for democracy. The unequivocal position taken by the Secretariat of Foreign
Aﬀairs with respect to the political crisis in Venezuela was noted for demonstrating a departure
from prior diplomatic doctrine, and a welcome vocal commitment to rule of law and
democracy in a region where the two seem eternally in peril.233 And the government has taken
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note of this: following the country’s condemnation of political oppression in Venezuela, the
administration has taken an active role in stepping in to the region to supply oil to the members
of Petrocaribe, a mechanism to supply the essential resource to the region.234 This may force
Havana to look to Mexico City for coöperation on political issues, raising the possibility of
Mexico being the force behind the spread of democracy to the half-a-century-old dictatorship.
However, in regard to Central America, the countries’ close ties to Mexico are
undeniable, given that the entire region once belonged to Mexico, Panama excluded. Their
physical proximity is an additional asset for Mexico. Given the asymmetry in the scale of
Mexico’s economy in comparison to its southern neighbors, Mexico should take a page out of
the U.S.’s handbook and use carrots to influence policy in the region. By pulling the region
into a well-defined sphere of influence, Mexico positions itself not only as a regional actor in
Latin America, but as the primary speaker for the smaller countries sandwiched between
Northern America and a distinct South America. Additionally, pursuing a leadership role in
Central America opens a physical path to the rest of Latin America.
The most important takeaway from such policy, however, is the benefits that Mexican
investment in infrastructure development in Latin America would provide for the receiving
countries as well as for Mexican enterprise. Today, a key reason why Mexico finds itself isolated
from the rest of the region is the lack of physical connectivity. The Pan-American highway is
to this day incomplete because of the impossibility in crossing the rainforest in Panama.
However, greater investment in the region would circumvent many of these issues, further
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fostering intraregional trade and economic development that does not depend on demand for
commodities or manufactured exports in the U.S. or China.
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VII. Final Thoughts
Mexico has been on a continuous process of democratic and economic consolidation
for the past three decades. This process is expected to continue over the course of the next
three. Several economic analyses of the state of global aﬀairs, in diplomatic and economic
terms, coincide in the country’s growth trajectory. By 2050, PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates
Mexico will grow to be the world’s seventh largest economy—behind China, India, the U.S.,
Indonesia, Brazil, and Russia, and ahead of every other advanced economy.235
As highlighted by a Goldman Sachs Working paper on the state of the world economy
in 2050, however, these are projections of the best estimates for growth based on the current
state of aﬀairs.236 And recent crises around the world as well as the all-too-familiar tune of a
“Mexican Miracle” demonstrate the possibility that these estimates are completely undermined
by political turbulence, natural disaster, or societal forces. This highlights the importance of
the policy recommendations comprehended in this thesis. For Mexico to continue down a
successful path of economic growth, increased market complexity, reduction in social
inequalities, and democratic consolidation, steps need to be taken to defend the state’s strategy
against political and social forces which seek to undermine the progress achieved to date.
This should not be taken to represent support nor repudiation for any candidates in
the upcoming federal election, nor the parties they represent. As stated in the introduction of
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this work, the purpose of this undertaking is to provide a framework upon which any given
administration—and ideally, those that come in 2024 and beyond—may build to create a
national economic strategy.
As outlined throughout the work, in looking towards the future, Mexico’s focus should
be expanding its strategic horizon. To date, federal policy has largely been framed in relation
to Mexico’s internal economy and its relation to the U.S. Going forth, this will not be enough.
More will need to be done on the diplomatic front to lay the foundation of a globally-oriented
policy outlook, but the executive dependencies and agencies of federal, state, and municipal
governments should be prepared to incorporate a more internationalist stance in developing
policies at all levels.
Critics of Mexico note that, in spite of the optimism presented by Pwc, Goldman
Sachs, and the like, the country faces virtually insurmountable challenges in becoming a global
power in any real sense. The preponderance of security problems in national- and
international-level discussion, the high degree of corruption which permeates all levels of
government and public service, social inequalities tied to historical imbalances, stigma rooted
deep in the Mexican psyche, and the self-servient nature of domestic politics, and the list goes
on. These are real and complex challenges, to be sure, and ones that will take more than simple
political will to overcome. But there’s an ocean between that and stating that the future of the
country is doomed, and that Mexico is destined to never be great.
Examples abound of the perseverance and drive that distinguish Mexicans. For a
country of backward-thinking farmers, Mexican genius Guillermo González Camarena
delivered color television to the world. For a country of misery and lack of means, Mexico
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produced two of the greatest artists in a generation in the form of Frida Kahlo and Diego
Rivera. And for a bastion of religious fanatics and regressive social norms, Luis Ernesto
Miramontes developed the first oral contraceptive, advancing the rights of women worldwide
from a laboratory in Mexico. And there is nothing to say that in the coming years, Mexico will
not be able to materialize each of these issues. The key is being prepared to take advantage of
any breaks in the status quo. As happens in Mexico as in the rest of the developing world,
opportunities are often times overlooked at the critical moment to act. Instead, issues are
addressed once they reach a boiling point, and even then, planning is rarely done with a vision
to the long-term concerns associated to the actions. My hope is that this thesis serves as a
preparatory schema, putting the foundation in place to enable the country to take advantage
of those breakthroughs. In this way, the country will be better prepared to deal with shock,
positive or adverse, and extract the most from any situation and repurposing it for the
achievement of a long-term plan.
And what is the plan? Standing in between Mexico and a primary position on the
global stage are myriad challenges. However, the Roman Empire was not built in a day, the
Spanish Empire was once little more than a feudal crown in Moorish lands, and the United
States began as a smattering of coastal colonies. The plan is to develop a longsighted vision and
work incessantly towards the achievement of that goal. If Rome, Castile, and the American
Colonies could do it, why not Mexico?
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